Irvin v. Contra Costa County Employees' Retirement Assn.
A149642
| Cal. Ct. App. | Jun 30, 2017Background
- Richard Irvin, a long‑time Contra Costa County employee, retired and later married Marianne; they separated and entered a judgment of legal separation finalizing property division and naming Marianne as intended pension beneficiary.
- Richard died soon after the legal separation; Marianne sought continuance (survivor) benefits under Gov. Code §31760.2, which the County Employees’ Retirement Association (Association) denied.
- The Association and its Board concluded a judgment of legal separation means Marianne was not a "surviving spouse," relying on Probate Code §78(d) and an outside counsel opinion adopted in 2009.
- Marianne petitioned for a writ of mandate; the trial court denied relief, adopting the Board’s interpretation and citing In re Marriage of Burson and Probate Code definitions.
- The Court of Appeal reversed: it held a judgment of legal separation does not dissolve the marriage, the plain meaning of "surviving spouse" includes legally separated spouses, and the Board offered no persuasive statutory or policy reason to exclude them from §31760.2 benefits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a person subject to a judgment of legal separation is a "surviving spouse" under Gov. Code §31760.2 | Irvin: legal separation leaves marital status intact; plain meaning and pension‑favoring rules include legally separated spouses | Association: Probate Code §78(d) excludes legally separated spouses; administrative practice and policy favor denying benefits to protect children | Held: Reversed — legally separated persons are "surviving spouses" under §31760.2; Board's interpretation not entitled to deference and lacks persuasive statutory/policy support |
| Degree of deference owed to the retirement board's informal interpretation of CERL | Irvin: limited; courts interpret statutes; deference inappropriate here | Association: board interpretation entitled to significant weight as administrator of pension plan | Held: Yamaha factors considered — only due consideration, not deference; local boards lack exclusive rulemaking and may diverge across counties |
| Whether Probate Code treatment of legally separated spouses controls CERL interpretation | Irvin: Probate Code is mixed; some provisions treat separated spouses like surviving spouses so §78(d) is not dispositive | Association: Probate Code §78(d) shows legislative intent to exclude legally separated spouses from "surviving spouse" | Held: Probate Code is internally inconsistent on this point; its definition does not compel excluding legally separated spouses from §31760.2 |
| Whether public policy favors denying survivor benefits to legally separated spouses | Irvin: no compelling public policy; excluding separated spouses may thwart decedent's intent and is for Legislature | Association: protecting minor children’s benefits justifies exclusion | Held: No persuasive public policy reason to deny benefits; policy concerns for children are speculative and do not overcome statutory interpretation and pensioner‑favorable rules |
Key Cases Cited
- Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265 (Cal. 1869) (early recognition of separate maintenance remedy)
- Faught v. Faught, 30 Cal.App.3d 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (characterizing legal separation as settlement of financial aspects)
- Lahey (Estate of Lahey), 76 Cal.App.4th 1056 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (a judgment of legal separation leaves marriage bonds intact)
- Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 1998) (framework for judicial weight to administrative statutory interpretations)
- Lopez v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.4th 1055 (Cal. 2010) (statutory construction principles)
- Bowen v. Board of Retirement, 42 Cal.3d 572 (Cal. 1986) (pension statutes construed liberally for beneficiaries)
- Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs’ Assn. v. Board of Retirement, 16 Cal.4th 483 (Cal. 1997) (ambiguities in pension legislation resolved in favor of pensioner)
- In re Marriage of Davis, 61 Cal.4th 846 (Cal. 2015) (use of legal history and term‑of‑art analysis in family law interpretation)