Irvin v. Contra Costa Cnty. Employees' Ret. Ass'n
13 Cal. App. 5th 162
| Cal. Ct. App. 5th | 2017Background
- Richard Irvin, a long‑time county employee, retired and later married Marianne; they entered a judgment of legal separation in 2013 pursuant to a marital settlement that preserved Marianne as his pension beneficiary and expressed his intent she be his "surviving spouse." Richard died months later.
- Marianne applied for continuance (survivor) benefits under Gov. Code §31760.2; the Contra Costa County Employees' Retirement Association denied benefits because the judgment of legal separation meant she was not a "surviving spouse."
- The Board relied on Probate Code §78(d) (which excludes legally separated persons from the probate definition of "surviving spouse") and a prior trial court decision (Burson) in applying that interpretation.
- Marianne petitioned for a writ of mandate; the trial court denied relief. The Court of Appeal reviewed de novo and reversed the denial.
- The appellate court held that a judgment of legal separation does not terminate the marriage; therefore the plain meaning of "surviving spouse" includes legally separated spouses under §31760.2, and the Board's contrary interpretation was not persuasive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a person subject to a judgment of legal separation is a "surviving spouse" under Gov. Code §31760.2 | Irvin: legal separation leaves marital status intact; plain meaning of "surviving spouse" includes legally separated spouse; marital agreement shows intent | Board: Probate Code §78(d) excludes legally separated spouses; Board's consistent administrative interpretation denies benefits to legally separated spouses; policy favors children receiving benefits | Held: Reversed — legally separated spouses are "surviving spouses" under §31760.2; judgment of legal separation does not end marriage |
| Whether the Board's interpretation is entitled to deference | Irvin: statutory interpretation is for courts; any administrative view gets "due consideration" but not deference here | Board: its long‑standing administrative practice should be given weight | Held: Board's view gets "due consideration" but not judicial deference — no comparative advantage, inconsistent local application, and interpretation not long‑standing or contemporaneous with adoption |
| Whether Probate Code treatment or other statutes compels excluding legally separated spouses from pension survivor benefits | Irvin: Probate Code is internally inconsistent — some provisions treat legally separated spouses as surviving spouses; absence of an express exclusion in CERL implies inclusion | Board: Probate Code §78 and related authorities show legislative intent to exclude legally separated spouses; statutory regime dividing pensions on separation supports exclusion | Held: Probate Code is inconclusive; other CERL provisions (e.g., notice provisions) do not demonstrate an intent to exclude; ambiguity resolved in favor of pensioner and inclusion is appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265 (establishing separate maintenance remedy)
- Bowen v. Board of Retirement, 42 Cal.3d 572 (pension legislation construed liberally in favor of beneficiaries)
- Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs' Assn. v. Board of Retirement, 16 Cal.4th 483 (ambiguities in pension statutes resolved for pensioners)
- Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 Cal.4th 1 (framework for giving weight to administrative statutory interpretations)
- Lahey, Estate of Lahey, 76 Cal.App.4th 1056 (judgment of legal separation leaves marriage intact)
- Faught v. Faught, 30 Cal.App.3d 875 (legal separation as final adjudication of financial aspects of marriage)