Irma Ovalles v. United States
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 11768
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Ovalles pled guilty in 2010 to multiple offenses arising from a violent crime spree, including attempted carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119) (Count Four) and a § 924(c) charge for using/carrying a firearm during that attempted carjacking (Count Five).
- At plea and sentencing she admitted the factual proffer: accomplices demanded keys, struck victims, an AK-47 was fired, and violence occurred; she received 108 months on underlying counts plus a consecutive 120 months on § 924(c), totaling 228 months; no direct appeal was filed.
- In 2016 Ovalles filed a § 2255 motion arguing Johnson v. United States rendered the § 924(c)(3)(B) “risk-of-force” clause void for vagueness, so her § 924(c) conviction/sentence was invalid because attempted carjacking no longer qualified as a crime of violence.
- The government argued Johnson does not apply to § 924(c)(3)(B) (which differs textually from the ACCA residual clause) and, alternatively, that attempted carjacking categorically qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements/use-of-force clause.
- The district court denied relief; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding Johnson does not invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B) and, alternatively, attempted carjacking qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson’s void‑for‑vagueness decision invalidates § 924(c)(3)(B) (the "risk‑of‑force" clause) | Johnson should apply because § 924(c)(3)(B) is nearly identical to the ACCA residual clause and is likewise vague | § 924(c)(3)(B) is materially different and narrower than the ACCA residual clause; Johnson does not apply | Johnson does not apply; § 924(c)(3)(B) remains valid |
| Whether attempted carjacking (§ 2119 attempt) fails to qualify as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(B) if that clause were invalid | If § 924(c)(3)(B) is invalid, Count Four would not be a qualifying predicate and Count Five would fail | Even if § 924(c)(3)(B) were invalid, attempted carjacking independently qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A) | Not reached as primary ground (clause valid), but alternatively Count Four qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A) |
| Whether attempted carjacking categorically qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A) (use‑of‑force elements clause) | Attempt is an inchoate offense requiring only a substantial step and thus does not necessarily involve attempted or threatened use of physical force | § 2119 (attempt) requires intent to cause death or serious bodily injury and a substantial step toward taking by force/violence or intimidation; intimidation with that intent necessarily involves attempted or threatened force | Attempted carjacking categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) |
| Whether Ovalles is entitled to § 2255 relief removing her § 924(c) conviction/sentence | Johnson-based challenge renders Count Five invalid and warranting relief | § 924(c)(3)(B) survives Johnson and Count Four independently satisfies § 924(c)(3)(A); therefore no relief due | § 2255 motion denied; conviction and sentence on Count Five affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (Struck down ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Held Johnson announced a new substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)
- United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2016) (Held § 924(c)(3)(B) materially different from ACCA residual clause; Johnson not controlling)
- United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016) (Concluded Johnson does not invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B))
- United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2016) (Reached same conclusion that § 924(c)(3)(B) survives Johnson)
- United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2016) (Held Johnson applies to § 924(c)(3)(B) but concluded predicate convictions nevertheless satisfied § 924(c)(3)(A))
- In re Smith, 829 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2016) (Recognized that § 2119 carjacking satisfies § 924(c)(3)(A))
- United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2013) (Discussed violent nature of intentionally destructive acts against property with extreme indifference)
- United States v. Kelley, 412 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2005) (Interpreted "intimidation" in bank robbery statute as a reasonable inference of threat of bodily harm)