Integrity Collision Center v. City of Fulshear, 837 F.3d 581

After leaving Fort Bend County’s program, the City of Fulshear (TX) created a non-consent tow list in April 2012 that the police chief populated with two companies (Riverside Collision and A&M Automotive), excluding Integrity Collision Center and Buentello Wrecker Service.
Integrity and Buentello sought inclusion, received written criteria in January 2014 (e.g., proximity ~10 miles, $1M insurance, heavy/rollback wreckers, hazardous-material capability, 30-minute response, driver background checks), and claimed to meet most requirements except the ten-mile guideline.
The police chief’s actual selection considerations were more subjective (e.g., ability of listed companies to “support each other,” past working experience); there was no formal administrative process for additions.
Integrity and Buentello sued in state court (July 2014), alleging a class-of-one § 1983 equal-protection violation; the case was removed to federal court and cross-motions for summary judgment followed.
The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs and ordered (1) inclusion of Integrity and Buentello in the towing rotation and (2) publication of neutral, exclusive criteria for admission; the City appealed.
The Fifth Circuit found the district court’s remedy order to be an appealable interlocutory injunction, considered whether class-of-one review applied, and reversed, rendering judgment for the City.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Applicability of class-of-one equal protection to non-consent tow list selection	City’s exclusion was arbitrary and thus actionable as a class-of-one	Selection is a discretionary purchasing/service decision not subject to class-of-one review	Court: class-of-one theory inapplicable to discretionary municipal service-provider selections (Engquist governs)
Requirement to show discriminatory intent	Arbitrary, ad hoc exclusion suffices to prove unequal treatment	Must show purposeful discrimination, not merely adverse effect	Court: plaintiffs produced no evidence of discriminatory intent; intent required
Rational-basis review of exclusion	No rational basis for excluding similarly situated companies	City’s articulated need for only two vendors and practical operational considerations are sufficient rational bases	Court: a conceivable rational basis exists (chief’s judgment that two companies suffice); plaintiffs failed to negate all rational bases
Appellate jurisdiction over remedy order	Plaintiffs: remedy order akin to non-appealable discovery order	City: remedy order is an injunction appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)	Court: remedy order is an injunction (directed, enforceable, substantive) and is appealable; jurisdiction proper

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (recognizes class-of-one equal-protection claim where objective, measurable standard permits review)
Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (class-of-one claims inapplicable to discretionary public-employment or similar individualized policymaking decisions)
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (rational-basis test upholds classification if any conceivable rational basis exists)
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (burden on challenger to negate any reasonably conceivable rational basis)
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (municipal liability requires final policymaker acting as such under state law)
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (limits on judicial replacement of managerial discretion)
Brown v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2006) (court may determine its own jurisdiction)
In re Deepwater Horizon, 793 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2015) (defining when a district-court action constitutes an appealable injunction)