904 F.3d 490
7th Cir.2018Background
- Wisconsin enacted Act 1 (2015), including a provision (Wis. Stat. §111.06(1)(i)) requiring employers to terminate payroll dues-checkoff authorizations within 30 days after an employee's written revocation.
- Dues-checkoff authorizations: voluntary, individual, written employee authorizations directing employers to deduct union dues; Taft-Hartley (29 U.S.C. §186(c)(4)) permits such checkoffs but caps irrevocability at one year.
- Lisa Aplin, a John Deere employee, had a checkoff authorization irrevocable for one year per a collective-bargaining agreement; after Act 1 she sent a revocation, John Deere and the union treated it as untimely.
- Aplin filed a state complaint; the state agency required compliance with the 30-day rule and ordered restitution for post-revocation deductions.
- The union sued in federal court arguing Act 1’s 30-day requirement is preempted by federal law; the district court enjoined enforcement of §111.06(1)(i).
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding federal law (as interpreted in Sea Pak and related precedent) preempts Wisconsin’s shorter revocation period and that §164(b)’s right-to-work exception does not authorize this state regulation of checkoffs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wis. Stat. §111.06(1)(i) (30‑day revocation) is preempted by 29 U.S.C. §186(c)(4) | Machinists (the union) argued Taft‑Hartley limits state regulation of checkoff terms and authorizes up to one‑year irrevocability, so Act 1 is preempted | Wisconsin argued §186(c)(4) is only a narrowing of a criminal statute and does not occupy the field; states may supplement under §164(b) | Court held §186(c)(4) preempts §111.06(1)(i); Sea Pak controls and Machinists/Garmon principles support field/conflict preemption |
| Whether Sea Pak’s summary affirmance remains controlling precedent | Union: Sea Pak is binding and directly controls cases rejecting state checkoff limits shorter than one year | State: doctrinal developments undermine Sea Pak’s precedential force; lower courts may depart | Court held Sea Pak remains binding and controlling; no intervening doctrinal shift justifies departure |
| Whether Taft‑Hartley §164(b) (right‑to‑work exception) saves Act 1’s checkoff rule | Wisconsin: §164(b) authorizes states to regulate union‑security‑related matters and use appropriate tools (e.g., 30‑day rule) | Union: §164(b) applies only to mandatory union‑security agreements (union/agency/union‑shop) not voluntary individual checkoffs | Court held §164(b) does not extend to voluntary dues‑checkoff authorizations and thus does not save §111.06(1)(i) from preemption |
| Whether general preemption principles (Garmon/Machinists) support preemption here | Union: Machinists and Garmon preemption bar state intrusion into terms reserved for private bargaining; allowing state rule would create conflict and double regulation | Wisconsin: modern preemption doctrine disfavors broad field preemption; §186(c)(4) sits in an anti‑corruption criminal provision and preserves employee choice | Court held labor‑law preemption (as applied in Sea Pak and Felter) and Machinists/Garmon doctrines bar state regulation of checkoff revocability beyond federal limits |
Key Cases Cited
- Sea Pak v. Industrial, Technical & Prof'l Emps., 400 U.S. 985 (1971) (Supreme Court’s summary affirmance of lower-court holding that state law shortening checkoff irrevocability was preempted)
- Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (establishes Machinists preemption: certain subjects are left to free bargaining and beyond state control)
- Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., 359 U.S. 326 (1959) (interprets materially identical RLA checkoff provision; reserves revocation rights and leaves non-statutory terms to private bargaining)
- Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008) (explains Garmon and Machinists preemption doctrines and their application to state regulation of labor matters)
- Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (explains precedential effect of Supreme Court summary dispositions and limited circumstances for departure)
- NLRB v. Atlanta Printing Specialties & Paper Prods. Union, 523 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1975) (discusses checkoffs as administrative convenience and federal protection of employee choice)