INMAN v. PENOBSCOT COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY OFFICE DA CHRIS ALMY, 1:17-cv-00412

Petitioner Frank Inman, a pretrial detainee, filed a habeas petition purportedly under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging counsel performance, bail conditions (including excessive bail), and jail conditions; he also moved for bail.
The claims in this petition substantially duplicate claims Inman previously raised in a separate case, Inman v. Penobscot County Jail, No. 1:17-cv-00358-GZS, from which he has appealed to the First Circuit.
The magistrate judge reviewed the filings and concluded the district court lacks jurisdiction over matters involved in the pending appeal and that the petition is an improper attempt to relitigate issues already decided in the separate proceeding.
The magistrate judge also concluded federal intervention in the state bail process is barred by Younger-type abstention and by the exhaustion requirement for habeas relief, because state remedies were not shown to be exhausted.
Recommendation: dismiss the petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, deny the motion for bail, and deny a certificate of appealability under Rule 11 because no substantial constitutional showing was made.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Jurisdiction after appeal	Inman seeks district-court review of same claims despite an active appeal in the First Circuit	Respondents rely on the rule that a notice of appeal divests the district court of control over matters involved in that appeal	Court: District court lacks jurisdiction over issues involved in the pending appeal; dismissal appropriate
Relitigation / abuse of process	Inman reasserts claims in new § 2254 petition	Respondents argue this is an attempt to relitigate issues already decided in the separate case now on appeal	Court: Petitioner may not relitigate; dismissal under Rule 4 is proper
Federal intervention in state bail proceedings	Inman asks federal court to review state bail decision (including alleged unlawful revocation/excessive bail)	Respondents invoke Younger abstention, comity, and exhaustion; state courts must be allowed to act first	Court: Federal habeas relief is inappropriate while state proceedings and remedies are pending/unexhausted; Younger-type principles bar intervention
Exhaustion of state remedies	Inman contends federal habeas is appropriate (and challenges factual basis of bail revocation)	Respondents assert Inman did not show exhaustion of available state remedies	Court: Petitioner alleged no facts showing exhaustion; exhaustion requirement precludes relief

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982) (a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and generally divests the district court of control over matters involved in the appeal)
United States v. Distasio, 820 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1987) (appeal-related divestiture of district court jurisdiction)
United States v. George, 841 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2016) (limited exceptions to divestiture concern matters unrelated to the substance of the appealed decision)
Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013) (federal courts should avoid intruding on ongoing state proceedings under Younger principles)
Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017) (state prisoners must exhaust available state remedies before federal habeas review)
United States v. Kehl, 456 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1972) (federal habeas principles and exhaustion apply with equal force to challenges to state bail processes)
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (the proper respondent in habeas is the immediate custodian)