Ingram v. State, 297 Ga. 854

Ingram, a member of the FOLKS gang, prepared Molotov cocktails and threw one into Charmaine Henderson’s apartment after a girlfriend asked him to “take care of” people allegedly mistreating her sister; the resulting fire killed two children, Donisha and Lexusous Henderson, by smoke inhalation.
A Fulton County grand jury indicted Ingram for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, first-degree arson, and possession of an explosive device; a jury acquitted on malice murder but convicted on two counts of felony murder and the remaining counts.
Ingram was sentenced to life without parole on the felony-murder convictions and concurrent 20-year terms on other counts.
Ingram’s post-conviction proceedings were substantially delayed; he filed an untimely motion for new trial, later sought an out-of-time appeal, and ultimately obtained permission to appeal years after the trial. The Court reiterated that extended delays are problematic but found no reversible error tied to delay.
On appeal Ingram challenged (1) denial of a continuance after the September 11, 2001 attacks, (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for two specific omissions, and (3) the trial court’s credibility instruction allowing jurors to consider witness intelligence.

Issue	Ingram's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Denial of continuance after Sept. 11, 2001	Jurors were affected by the attacks and could not be impartial; trial should be continued	Court questioned jurors; none indicated inability to serve; events did not relate to case facts	No abuse of discretion in denying continuance
Ineffective assistance — no on-the-record waiver of right not to testify	Trial counsel failed to secure an on-the-record waiver of Ingram’s decision not to testify	Claims were raised in an untimely motion for new trial and Ingram failed to file a subsequent valid motion after obtaining an out-of-time appeal	Procedurally barred from review
Ineffective assistance — prosecutor sang “Happy Birthday” to victims during closing	Counsel should have objected to prosecutor’s conduct	Same procedural-bar argument; claim was raised untimely and not preserved properly after out-of-time appeal	Procedurally barred from review
Jury instruction listing intelligence as a factor for credibility	Inclusion of intelligence is improper/confusing per McKenzie	Even if not best practice, Georgia precedent allows inclusion and it is not reversible error	No reversible error in giving the charge

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32 (2009) (credibility and jury factfinding deference)
Geiger v. State, 295 Ga. 648 (2014) (abuse-of-discretion standard for continuance denials)
Kemp v. State, 259 Ga. App. 302 (2003) (trial during week of Sept. 11 not error where jurors could serve)
Sanders v. State, 289 Ga. 655 (2011) (procedural bar where ineffective-assistance claims were not raised in a valid motion for new trial after out-of-time appeal)
McKenzie v. State, 293 Ga. App. 350 (2008) (criticizing use of intelligence in credibility charge as confusing)
Howard v. State, 288 Ga. 741 (2011) (holding inclusion of intelligence in credibility charge is not reversible error)
Gamble v. State, 291 Ga. 581 (2012) (same — not plain error to include intelligence as credibility factor)
Walker v. State, 295 Ga. 688 (2014) (warning about harms of extended delays in post-conviction proceedings)
Smith v. State, 288 Ga. 348 (2010) (prosecutorial conduct and trial-court duty to control courtroom decorum)
R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576 (1982) (trial judges’ duty to maintain dignity and decorum in courtrooms)