Indiana Right to Life Victory Fund v. Diego Morales, 217 N.E.3d 517

Indiana Right to Life Victory Fund (a Super PAC) and Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. (a corporation) sought a $10,000 corporate contribution earmarked for the Victory Fund’s independent expenditures.
Sarkes Tarzian did not donate, believing Indiana Code §§ 3-9-2-3 to -6 bar corporate contributions that fund independent expenditures; the State’s election officials contend they would not enforce such a ban because of Citizens United.
Plaintiffs sued state election officials in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction; the district court dismissed for lack of standing because officials disclaimed enforcement.
The Seventh Circuit certified the question of statutory meaning to the Indiana Supreme Court: whether §§ 3-9-2-3 to -6 prohibit corporate contributions to PACs for independent campaign-related expenditures (i.e., Super PACs).
The Indiana Supreme Court held the Code prohibits corporate contributions to PACs earmarked for independent expenditures because § 3(b) limits corporate contributions to those authorized by §§ 4–6, and §§ 4–6 do not authorize contributions to independent-expenditure-only PACs.
The Court refused to apply constitutional-avoidance to rewrite the unambiguous statutes, leaving any remedy for constitutional tension to the General Assembly; Justice Goff dissented, urging an interpretation that avoids conflict with Citizens United.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Indiana Code §§ 3-9-2-3 to -6 prohibit corporate contributions to PACs earmarked for independent expenditures (Super PACs)	The Code’s silence should not be read to prohibit contributions; Citizens United protects corporate funding of independent expenditures (plaintiffs say the statutes are unconstitutional as applied).	The statutes do not prohibit such contributions; officials interpret and will not enforce the Code to bar corporate contributions to independent-expenditure PACs.	Held: The Code prohibits these contributions—§ 3(b) limits corporate contributions to those authorized by §§ 4–6, and §§ 4–6 do not authorize contributions to Super PACs for independent expenditures.
Whether the court should use constitutional-avoidance to interpret the statutes as permitting the contributions to avoid conflict with Citizens United	Plaintiffs rely on Citizens United to argue the statutes cannot be enforced against such contributions.	Officials urge the Court to construe statutes permissively to avoid a constitutional clash because they will not enforce them otherwise.	Held: The statutes are unambiguous; the Court will not rewrite clear statutory text under the avoidance canon. Any statutory fix must come from the legislature.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (First Amendment forbids restrictions on corporate independent expenditures)
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (courts should not rewrite statutes to save them from constitutional problems)
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (courts will not rewrite a law to conform it to constitutional requirements)
Rogers v. Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316 (Ind. 2016) (apply plain statutory meaning where text is clear)
Wisconsin Right to Life State PAC v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139 (7th Cir. 2011) (discusses enforcement risks and First Amendment implications for campaign-finance laws)
State v. Terre Haute Brewing Co., 115 N.E. 772 (Ind. 1917) (historical reference to an earlier broad prohibition on corporate political contributions)