in the Matter of T.V.T., 651 S.W.3d 1

Background

Appellant was 13 at the time of the alleged offense; the complainant was 12. The petition alleged aggravated sexual assault based on the actor causing penetration of the complainant’s mouth with his sexual organ (Tex. Penal Code § 22.021).
Appellant filed a pretrial habeas application and motions to quash and dismiss, arguing a child under 14 lacks legal capacity to "knowingly" commit the offense and thus cannot be prosecuted under § 22.021.
The trial court held a non‑evidentiary hearing, the State conceded both parties were under 14, denied appellant’s motions and habeas, and appellant then stipulated true to the allegation and was adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation with sex‑offender treatment conditions.
On appeal appellant challenged the adjudication, arguing the petition failed to state an offense and that § 22.021 is facially and as‑applied unconstitutional as applied to a child under 14.
The court held that, under binding Texas Supreme Court precedent (In re B.W.), a child younger than 14 lacks the legal capacity to ‘‘knowingly’’ consent to sex; because "knowing" is an element of aggravated sexual assault, a child under 14 cannot be prosecuted under § 22.021.
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed the adjudication, concluding the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to quash, and rendered judgment dismissing the case with prejudice; it did not reach appellant’s constitutional claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a child under 14 can be prosecuted for aggravated sexual assault under Tex. Penal Code § 22.021	A child under 14 lacks legal capacity to "knowingly" engage in sexual conduct, so the statute cannot apply to such children	In re B.W. was limited to prostitution; Legislature intended § 22.021 to reach younger actors and accommodated them via juvenile sentencing limits	Held: A child under 14 lacks the capacity to satisfy the "knowing" element; therefore § 22.021 cannot be used to prosecute a child under 14 for aggravated sexual assault.
Whether the juvenile petition stated an offense (motion to quash/dismiss)	Petition failed to state a claim because appellant legally cannot be found to have acted "knowingly"	The juvenile code and statutes allow adjudication of penal-law violations by juveniles	Held: Petition failed to state an offense as to a child under 14, so trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to quash.
Whether In re B.W. controls application of "knowing" requirement to aggravated sexual assault	In re B.W. establishes that children under 14 lack capacity to "knowingly" consent to sex and its rationale extends to other statutes requiring a knowing mental state	In re B.W. should be cabined to prostitution and not extended to aggravated sexual assault	Held: In re B.W. is binding and its reasoning extends to § 22.021; lower courts are bound by the supreme court’s conclusion about capacity.
Whether court must resolve constitutional challenges to § 22.021	Appellant also argued facial and as‑applied unconstitutionality	State urged upholding statute or addressing constitutional claims	Held: Court resolved case on non‑constitutional ground (petition failure) and declined to address constitutional claims.

Key Cases Cited

In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818 (Tex. 2010) (children under 14 lack legal capacity to consent to sex; central precedent limiting prosecution of minors where "knowing" consent is required)
In re R.R.S., 535 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017) (addressed sufficiency of "knowing" element for 13‑year‑old adjudicated of aggravated sexual assault)
State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279 (Tex. 2006) (trial court’s interpretation of law reviewed de novo)
Gonzales v. State, 304 S.W.3d 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (describing conduct‑oriented offenses and mental‑state definitions)
Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local No. 1338, 273 S.W.3d 659 (Tex. 2008) (Texas Supreme Court decisions are binding precedent)
Rubio v. State, 607 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (intent cannot be inferred merely from the act of sexual conduct)