IN THE MATTER OF GIOVANI COLON, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS(CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION), A-1726-15T4

On June 2, 2010, Marianne Murphy (plaintiff) and Raeann Martin (defendant) engaged in a roadway confrontation after Murphy changed lanes; accounts of escalation diverged sharply.
Murphy testified Martin followed, shouted, gestured, and ultimately struck Murphy’s convertible with a van while Murphy’s driver’s door was open; Murphy had a small bat in the car and called a retired police-officer friend during the incident.
Martin admitted her van struck Murphy’s open door while attempting to leave because she felt threatened after Murphy allegedly brandished a bat and stood outside her car.
Two Hazlet police officers testified they spoke to both drivers; officers recovered a small bat from Murphy’s vehicle and described Murphy as vague and not forthcoming; neither officer reported eyewitnesses at arrival.
The trial was bifurcated; after a three-day liability phase, the court, over Murphy’s objection, instructed the jury with the Model Civil Charge on “sudden emergency.” The jury returned a unanimous no-cause verdict for Martin.
The Appellate Division reversed, holding the sudden emergency charge was improvidently given in these facts and had the capacity to prejudice the jury; remanded for a new trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court should have given the Model "sudden emergency" jury charge	Murphy argued the charge was unduly prejudicial, confusing, unnecessary, and that comparative negligence charges sufficed	Martin argued the situation—being threatened by a driver with a bat and attempting to flee—fit the sudden emergency doctrine and justified the charge	Court held the charge was improvidently given; the emergency (if any) arose from the mutual altercation, not an external, faultless sudden emergency, so the disfavored charge should not have been given
Whether the erroneous charge required reversal and a new trial	Murphy contended the charge unfairly aided defendant and could skew jurors’ assessment of fault	Martin implicitly argued any error was harmless given the verdict	Court held the error was harmful because the charge gave a judicial imprimatur favoring defendant and could taint deliberations; reversed and remanded for a new trial

Roberts v. Hooper, 181 N.J. Super. 474 (App. Div. 1981) (defines sudden emergency doctrine and its exculpatory effect)
Finley v. Wiley, 103 N.J. Super. 95 (App. Div. 1968) (criticizes sudden emergency instruction as confusing)
Leighton v. Sim, 248 N.J. Super. 577 (App. Div. 1991) (sudden emergency instruction should be given only in most unusual circumstances)
Stokes v. Saltonstall, 38 U.S. 181 (U.S. 1839) (early U.S. adoption of sudden emergency doctrine)
Velazquez v. Portadin, 163 N.J. 677 (2000) (underscores necessity of accurate jury instructions)
Washington v. Perez, 219 N.J. 338 (2014) (importance of precise jury instructions)
Das v. Thani, 171 N.J. 518 (2002) (jury charge is a roadmap; improper charges can mislead jury)
State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281 (discusses critical role of proper jury charges)