508 S.W.3d 613
Tex. App.2016Background
- Juvenile appellant E.O.E. was charged with delinquent conduct for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon after a June 30, 2013 fight in which Jorge Quinones was stabbed during an altercation at a house party.
- Quinones described being attacked and observed a knife; he could not positively identify E.O.E. from photo lineups but gave a description to police months later.
- Officer Rodolfo Moreno encountered E.O.E. a few houses from the scene: companions fled when Moreno arrived, E.O.E. reached toward his back pocket, was sweating, and initially resisted stopping; a pat-down produced a knife.
- Defense contested: (1) request for a jury self-defense instruction; (2) motion to suppress the stop/frisk as an unconstitutional Terry stop; (3) motion for mistrial alleging Brady violation when the State disclosed DNA-expert knife photographs during trial; and (4) motion for new trial asserting prosecutorial misconduct and additional Brady claims related to Officer Moreno’s prior 2008 shooting.
- Trial court denied the self-defense instruction and suppress motion, struck the DNA expert’s testimony and photographs when late-disclosed but denied mistrial, and denied the new-trial motion; the court of appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Self-defense instruction | Evidence raised self-defense (witnesses said Quinones continued to follow; appellant tried to retreat). | Appellant never admitted to committing the offense; evidence shows he provoked the fight, swung first, used rocks, threatened with knife—no entitlement to instruction. | Court: No error; instruction not required because appellant did not admit conduct needed to assert statutory self-defense. |
| 2. Motion to suppress (stop/frisk) | Officer Moreno lacked reasonable suspicion; stop was based on a “hunch.” | Stop was supported by totality of circumstances: proximity to fight, time (juvenile curfew), companions’ flight, reaching for back pocket, sweating, appellant’s admission he came from the party. | Court: Denial affirmed; collective facts gave reasonable suspicion for investigative stop and frisk. |
| 3. Motion for mistrial / Brady (late disclosure of DNA photos) | State withheld favorable/impeachment evidence (expert’s photographs), requiring mistrial. | Photos were disclosed during trial, objected to, and court struck expert testimony and exhibits and instructed jury to disregard; defense did not request continuance. | Court: No reversible Brady error; striking testimony and instruction cured prejudice; failure to seek continuance waives complaint. |
| 4. Motion for new trial / prosecutorial misconduct (Brady re: 2008 shooting) | State failed to disclose impeachment/exculpatory material concerning Officer Moreno’s prior on-duty shooting and misstatements about it. | State complied with discovery; Moreno’s prior civil matter was not criminal or disciplinary and did not produce Brady material; misstatements were corrected at bill of review. | Court: Denial of new trial affirmed; no Brady prejudice or prosecutorial misconduct shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (establishes standard for investigative stops and frisks)
- Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (U.S. 1983) (police may ask questions during encounters; limits on detention)
- United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1989) (reasonable-suspicion standard lower than probable cause; totality of circumstances)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963) (prosecution must disclose exculpatory/impeachment evidence)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (U.S. 1985) (materiality standard for nondisclosed evidence affecting outcome)
- Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (harm analysis for jury-charge error)
- Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (what constitutes evidence "raising" a defensive theory)
- Lee v. State, 442 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014) (review standard for denied defensive instruction)
- Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (deference to trial court’s factual findings on suppression)
