In the Matter of Deborah Munson and Coralee Beal
146 A.3d 153
| N.H. | 2016Background
- Parties (Munson and Beal) cohabited from 1993, entered a civil union in 2008, which converted to marriage in 2011; divorce filed in 2012.
- Trial court treated the marriage as "short-term," used civil-union date (2008) as start date, and awarded Beal ~12% of the marital estate and five years of alimony ($500/month).
- Beal argued the court should have considered ~15 years of premarital cohabitation and commingling when dividing marital property and awarding alimony.
- Trial court made factual findings about long premarital cohabitation and financial interdependence but declined to treat cohabitation as part of the marriage length.
- Supreme Court of New Hampshire held premarital cohabitation is a permissible factor under RSA 458:16-a(II)(o); trial court’s failure to consider the cohabitation rendered its property division and alimony award unsustainable.
Issues
| Issue | Munson's Argument | Beal's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May premarital cohabitation be considered when equitably dividing marital property? | Court already has discretion; no new rule needed; cohabitation need not be treated as marriage length. | Court should treat lengthy premarital cohabitation/commingling as relevant to property division and may effectively extend the relationship for equitable purposes. | Premarital cohabitation is a permissible factor under RSA 458:16-a(II)(o); duration-of-marriage factor itself, however, refers only to legal marriage. |
| Did the trial court err by using the civil-union date as the exclusive start date and treating the marriage as short-term? | The statutory factors were considered; civil-union date is proper start date for marriage duration. | The court ignored premarital facts showing long-term economic partnership and thus misapplied discretion. | Yes; the court made findings of premarital interdependence but failed to consider them under the statute, an unsustainable failure to exercise discretion; property division vacated. |
| Effect of the erroneous property division on alimony? | Alimony decision was based on the court’s overall evaluation, including property division. | Alimony must reflect proper property award and the parties’ economic circumstances, including premarital cohabitation effects. | Vacated alimony award because statutory alimony factors require consideration of the property division, which was unsustainable. |
| Does allowing consideration of premarital cohabitation create retroactive marital status or violate retroactivity principles? | Considering cohabitation would retroactively change marital status and impose new obligations. | Consideration is simply a discretionary evidentiary factor, not retroactive recognition of marriage. | Rejected retroactivity concern; permitting consideration of premarital cohabitation is an interpretive use of existing statute and does not retroactively alter marital status. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hoffman v. Hoffman, 143 N.H. 514 (1999) (addressing premarital cohabitation evidence but declining to decide its legal effect where marriage duration alone sufficed)
- In the Matter of Crowe & Crowe, 148 N.H. 218 (2002) (rejecting adoption of a specific rule subsuming premarital cohabitation into marriage duration for property division)
- In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426 (2006) (discussing statutory presumption of equal division and factors for departure)
- Loughlin v. Loughlin, 910 A.2d 963 (Conn. 2006) (concluding length of marriage does not include premarital cohabitation but recognizing cohabitation may bear on other statutory factors)
- Lind v. Lind, 139 P.3d 1032 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (holding courts may consider premarital cohabitation under a broadly worded discretionary factor)
- Nielsen v. Nielsen, 446 N.W.2d 356 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding consideration of a lengthy premarital cohabitation period in equitable division)