In the Interest Of: T. L., a Child
340 Ga. App. 733
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Five juveniles were charged in 2015 with multiple car break-ins; juvenile delinquency petitions were filed and amended in Douglas County Juvenile Court.
- The State moved to transfer the delinquency cases to superior court for criminal prosecution; the juvenile court granted the transfer orders after hearings.
- The juveniles filed direct appeals from the juvenile court transfer orders to the Court of Appeals.
- OCGA § 15-11-564 (part of the 2014 Juvenile Code) states that a transfer decision is “only … an interlocutory judgment” and that a child or the prosecutor has the right to have it reviewed by the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals held the juveniles were required to use the interlocutory-appeal procedure (OCGA § 5-6-34(b)); because they did not, the appeals were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether OCGA § 15-11-564 requires interlocutory-appeal procedure for juvenile-to-superior transfer orders | Juveniles argued they could directly appeal transfer orders as final under prior precedent | State argued the statute makes transfer orders interlocutory and requires OCGA § 5-6-34(b) procedure | Court held § 15-11-564 renders such transfer orders interlocutory and requires interlocutory application procedure |
| Whether failure to follow interlocutory procedure deprives the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction | Juveniles proceeded by direct appeal relying on pre‑2014 precedent | State argued jurisdiction is lacking absent interlocutory application and certificate of immediate review | Court dismissed the direct appeals for lack of jurisdiction due to noncompliance |
| Whether the statute’s provision that either child or prosecutor has the right to review creates a direct-appeal right | Juveniles implied the statute granted a substantive right to direct appeal | State read the language as authorizing interlocutory review by application, consistent with ‘‘interlocutory’’ terminology | Court construed the language as enabling interlocutory review (not direct appeal) and consistent with appeal-by-application framework |
| Whether prior decisions treating transfer orders as final remain applicable under the new Juvenile Code | Juveniles relied on prior cases treating transfer orders as final and directly appealable | State argued the 2014 Juvenile Code changed that rule for proceedings commenced after Jan 1, 2014 | Court held prior precedent is displaced for cases governed by the new Juvenile Code; limited overruling of In the Interest of J.M.S. as to that point |
Key Cases Cited
- Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170 (presumption that legislature means what it says)
- Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (statutory terms of art carry established legal meaning)
- In re Motion of Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 269 Ga. 589 (definition of "interlocutory")
- Cherry v. Coast House, 257 Ga. 403 (interlocutory orders require OCGA § 5-6-34(b) procedure for appellate jurisdiction)
- Fulton County Dept. of Family & Children Svcs. v. Perkins, 244 Ga. 237 (prior precedent treating juvenile-to-superior transfer orders as directly appealable)
- Rivers v. State, 229 Ga. App. 12 (same)
- Houser v. State, 234 Ga. 209 (appellate courts will not review trial court discretion to grant or deny certificate for immediate review)