2019 COA 24
Colo. Ct. App.2019Background
- Joshua J. Ray was involuntarily certified for short-term (up to 3 months) mental-health treatment by a Colorado-licensed physician under §27-65-107 after a voluntary hospital admission.
- The certification was filed with the Denver Probate Court as required; either the court clerk, the State Court Administrator (SCA), or the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) then caused Ray’s name to be entered into the federal National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).
- The physician terminated the certification days later and Ray was discharged; he later learned he remained listed in NICS based on that certification.
- Ray petitioned the probate court to remove the NICS listing, arguing a physician’s certification is not a “court order” and thus not reportable under Colorado’s reporting statute, §13-9-123(1)(c).
- The probate court dismissed Ray’s claim; on appeal the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding a professional-person certification is not a court order and directing the probate court, SCA, and CBI to take reasonable steps to rescind any submission of Ray’s certification to NICS.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a certification by a "professional person" under §27-65-107 is a "court order" requiring reporting to NICS under §13-9-123(1)(c) | Ray: Certification by a physician is not a court order and therefore is not reportable to NICS under §13-9-123(1)(c). | SCA/CBI: Certification should be treated as equivalent to a court order for reporting purposes to effectuate federal firearms prohibitions. | Court of Appeals: No. "Court order" means an order entered by a court; a physician is not a court. Certification by a professional person is not a court order and therefore did not trigger reporting under §13-9-123(1)(c). |
Key Cases Cited
- Curnow v. Yarbrough, 676 P.2d 1177 (Colo. 1984) (upheld constitutionality of Colorado’s short-term civil-commitment statutory scheme)
- Brown v. Jensen, 572 F. Supp. 193 (D. Colo. 1983) (related precedent on civil-commitment procedure)
- People v. Martinez, 70 P.3d 474 (Colo. 2003) (statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo)
- Turbyne v. People, 151 P.3d 563 (Colo. 2007) (courts must apply clear statutory language as written; may not add or subtract words)
(Decision reversed and remanded with directions to correct or remove Ray’s NICS-related records submitted under §13-9-123(1)(c); the court did not and did not purport to resolve whether Ray remains disqualified under federal law §922(g)(4).)