In the Interest of M.I.M.
370 S.W.3d 94
| Tex. App. | 2012Background
- OAG filed a UIFSA-based petition in Collin County to establish child support for M.I.M. against Blackmore.
- Earlier, a 2002 case in the 296th District Court was dismissed for want of prosecution after Morales fled with M.I.M. to Guatemala.
- Morales requested OAG's assistance to obtain support; OAG sought to obtain personal jurisdiction over Blackmore.
- In 2009, the 219th District Court granted Blackmore’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the UIFSA petition.
- Question presented include whether UIFSA jurisdiction can be established and whether continuing exclusive jurisdiction exists given prior dismissal; whether UIFSA allows an affirmative defense based on the child’s death; and whether §152.208 (conduct-based) applies to UIFSA.
- The court held that UIFSA petition can confer jurisdiction and that prior dismissal does not create continuing exclusive jurisdiction, among other holdings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| UIFSA jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over Blackmore | OAG: Collin County can obtain personal jurisdiction over Blackmore under UIFSA §159.301. | Blackmore: court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to prior dismissal and custody controls. | Jurisdiction exists under UIFSA; Collin County can obtain personal jurisdiction. |
| Continuing exclusive jurisdiction after dismissal | OAG: 2002 dismissal does not vest continuing exclusive jurisdiction in 296th District Court. | Blackmore may argue lack of ongoing jurisdiction due to prior proceedings. | The 296th District Court does not retain continuing exclusive jurisdiction after dismissal. |
| Whether M.I.M.'s current residence/existence is dispositive | UIFSA requires identification; residency/existence can be contested but is not fatal to jurisdiction. | Blackmore: lack of current existence/residency defeats jurisdiction. | Residency/existence issues do not, as a matter of law, defeat jurisdiction; fact questions remain. |
| Affirmative defense based on death of child | OAG argues absence of proof of death as required to negate duty to support. | Blackmore asserts lack of current M.I.M. identity and existence; death defense possible. | Death is an affirmative defense; failure to prove current existence is not alone fatal to jurisdiction; fact issues exist. |
| Applicability of §152.208 to UIFSA | OAG: §152.208 does not apply to UIFSA proceedings; UIFSA stands independently from UCCJEA. | Blackmore: conduct-based declination rules could apply via §152.208. | §152.208 does not apply to UIFSA proceedings; only applies to UCCJEA cases. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re S.J.A., 272 S.W.3d 678 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008) (jurisdictional issues: review de novo with liberal pleadings)
- Texas Parks & Wildlife Dept. v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (jurisdictional inquiry; liberal construction of pleadings)
- Seligman-Hargis v. Hargis, 186 S.W.3d 582 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006) (jurisdictional pleading standard)
- Flores v. Melo-Palacios, 921 S.W.2d 399 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996) (interstate custody vs. child support distinctions)
- Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (198}1978) (basis of jurisdiction in child support: minimum contacts)