in the Interest Of: M.A.A.
05-14-01180-CV
| Tex. App. | Aug 23, 2016Background
- M.A.A., born in 2009 with Down Syndrome, tested positive for cocaine and opiates at birth; TDPS filed a SAPCR seeking emergency protection and termination of parents’ rights.
- Temporary orders placed M.A.A. in TDPS conservatorship; he was soon placed with paternal grandparents Nancy and Andrew Aiken.
- Rhodes (maternal grandmother) petitioned for grandparent visitation and to be named joint managing conservator; parties mediated and signed an agreement appointing the Aikens as joint managing conservators and granting Rhodes visitation; the trial court entered a final SAPCR order that became final and unappealed.
- Years later, when the Aikens planned to relocate to New Mexico, Rhodes moved to modify the final order to impose a domicile/geographic restriction on the Aikens and to be named joint managing conservator; she also later filed motions to enforce and to recuse.
- After a bench trial the court denied Rhodes’s requested domicile restriction and her request to be named joint managing conservator, adjusted Rhodes’s visitation to accommodate the Aikens’ relocation, and made findings that the Aikens had the right to designate the child’s primary residence under the prior order and that modification to impose a restriction was not shown to be in the child’s best interest.
- Rhodes appealed pro se raising numerous complaints; the Court of Appeals reviewed and affirmed the trial court’s orders.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of final SAPCR order (collateral attack) | Rhodes argued the mediated settlement and resulting final order were invalid/void and failed to account for child’s special needs. | Appellees argued the final order was valid; defects in the settlement, if any, rendered judgment voidable not void. | Court: Final SAPCR order is not void; Rhodes’s attack is collateral and thus improper—issues are voidable and must be directly appealed. |
| Modification: domicile/geographic restriction | Rhodes sought a residency restriction on the Aikens to prevent relocation and asked to be named joint managing conservator, arguing relocation would impede her visitation and harm the child. | Aikens and trial court relied on prior order appointing them JM conservators with right to designate primary residence; relocation was for legitimate reasons and not shown to harm child. | Court: No abuse of discretion. Rhodes failed to show modification imposing a domicile restriction or appointment of Rhodes as JMC was in child’s best interest. |
| Modification of visitation without pleading | Rhodes argued the trial court modified visitation without proper pleadings or authority. | Trial court modified visitation in response to Rhodes’s claims about travel burden; any pleading deficiency was tried by consent. | Court: Any unpleaded issue was tried by consent; modification was permissible to balance access and relocation; no error. |
| Enforcement and recusal orders reviewability | Rhodes argued the trial court erred denying her motion to enforce visitation and complained about denial of recusal. | Appellees: orders are non-appealable collateral matters. | Court: Denial of enforcement (contempt/other relief) and post-judgment recusal ruling are not reviewable by direct appeal here; appellate jurisdiction lacking. |
Key Cases Cited
- Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2005) (distinguishing void from voidable judgments)
- Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1985) (defining when a judgment is void)
- Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1987) (errors other than jurisdictional render judgment voidable)
- Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1982) (trial court given wide latitude on child’s best interest review standard)
- Norman v. Norman, 692 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. 1985) (order refusing contempt not reviewable by direct appeal)