In the Interest of I.I.G.T., a Child, 412 S.W.3d 803

Child born in 2001; mother executed an acknowledgment of paternity in March 2009 naming Roderick Alexander as father. Mother filed to rescind three months later.
Alexander filed a counterpetition seeking appointment as joint managing conservator and requested genetic testing. Testing (Sept. 1, 2009) showed Alexander is not the biological father. Trial court initially dismissed and amended judgment later, then granted mother’s motion for new trial.
Mother repeatedly pleaded lack of standing. On December 23, 2010 the trial court granted Mother’s plea to the jurisdiction, dismissed Alexander’s counterpetition, and denied his claims. Alexander appealed.
Alexander claimed standing under Tex. Fam. Code §102.003(a)(9) as a nonparent who allegedly had actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months. He testified to regular weekend possession, school and medical involvement, financial support, and that the child had a bedroom in his home.
Mother testified the child only visited Alexander (weekends/holidays/summers), there was no agreement for the child to live with him, and the arrangements were temporary and permissive.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Alexander, a nonparent, have standing under Fam. Code §102.003(a)(9) to bring an original SAPCR?	Alexander: His six-plus months of possession (weekends, holidays, some 2005 period, regular 2009 weekend possession), caregiving, school/medical involvement, and the child’s bedroom at his house show a principal, consistent residence and satisfy §102.003(a)(9).	Mother: Possession was temporary and permissive (visits), there was no agreement or court order making his home the child’s principal residence; thus Alexander did not meet the statute’s six-month/principal-residence requirement.	Court: Affirmed trial court — Alexander lacked standing because the record supports that his possession was temporary/consensual, not a principal residence occupied consistently over a substantial period.

In re M.K.S.-V., 301 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009) (nonparent with contractual possession schedule held to have standing under §102.003(a)(9))
In re M.P.B., 257 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008) (grandmother’s consistent, permanent caregiving supported standing under §102.003(a)(9))
Doncer v. Dickerson, 81 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002) (step-parent with long-term possession under an agreed order had standing)
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (when jurisdictional facts are disputed, fact issues must be resolved by the factfinder)
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) (standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction)