in the Estate of Jack Hiromi Ikenaga Sr.
04-15-00005-CV
| Tex. App. | Sep 23, 2015Background
- After Jack H. Ikenaga, Sr. died, Sandra Ikenaga initiated probate and sued relatives, the estate’s temporary administrator, and ACCC Holding Corporation.
- The disputes centered on transfers of Jack Sr.’s stock and interests in businesses, and whether those transfers were wrongful or belonged to the estate.
- The parties settled; the settlement was dictated into the record and parties approved it, with a plan to draft a final agreement.
- Sandra refused to sign a written final agreement, so the trial court entered a final judgment based on the settlement terms.
- The final judgment provided for a distribution to Sandra totaling about $5 million and required restitution of certain assets, including returning vehicles and ashes, with Sandra later accepting payments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver by acceptance of benefits | Ikenaga argues Sandra waived appeal by accepting benefits. | Appellees contend Sandra’s acceptance bars challenge to the final judgment. | Sandra’s waiver by accepting benefits bars the appeal. |
| Preservation of compliance with the settlement | Sandra maintains the final judgment did not strictly comply with the settlement. | Appellees argue Sandra did not preserve such objection and conceded compliance. | Sandra did not preserve the complaint about strict compliance. |
| Strict compliance of final judgment with settlement | Sandra claims substantive variances between the final judgment and the settlement. | Appellees assert only minor textual changes, with no material deviation from terms. | There is strict compliance; no material variance. |
| Court’s review of summary judgment orders | Sandra argues the final judgment rests on the summary judgments and evidentiary rulings. | Appellees contend the final judgment is not based on those orders and review is limited. | The court does not review summary judgments in deciding the final judgment’s validity. |
Key Cases Cited
- Leedy v. Leedy, 399 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013) (waiver via acceptance of benefits bar refers to appellate doctrine)
- PGP Gas Prods., Inc. v. Fariss, 620 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1981) (preservation requirement for appellate complaints)
- McLendon v. McLendon, 847 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992) (reformation of judgments when no material variance)
- Rosales v. Rosales, No. 04-05-00906-CV, 2006 WL 2955602 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006) (no reversal for clerical or textual variances if not material)
- Vickrey v. American Youth Camps, Inc., 532 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1976) (strict compliance requirement for settlement-based judgments)
- Salmon v. Salmon, 395 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1965) (family settlements valid when heirs agree to not probate will)
- Stephens v. Dolcefino, 126 S.W.3d 120 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003) (briefing standards and waiver considerations on appeal)
- Doncaster v. Hernaiz, 161 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005) (abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings on summary judgments)