183 Conn. App. 327
Conn. App. Ct.2018Background
- Zoey born May 9, 2015; mother was homeless and exhibited mental‑health issues; Commissioner obtained ex parte temporary custody and placed Zoey in foster care.
- On September 23, 2015 the court adjudicated Zoey "uncared for" and committed her to the Commissioner’s custody; a putative father at that time stood silent and was later proven not to be the biological father and was dismissed.
- Jonathan S. (respondent) was cited into the case in 2016, genetic testing confirmed paternity, and he filed motions to revoke the commitment (May 2016 and June 2017).
- The court issued court‑ordered specific steps (services, evaluations, supervised visits); respondent attended some services but failed to comply with most requirements and refused certain evaluations.
- The trial court denied both motions to revoke after hearings, finding respondent had not met the burden to show cause for commitment no longer existed and that his noncompliance and conduct raised safety and bonding concerns.
- Respondent appealed, asserting violations of procedural and substantive due process (challenging § 46b‑129(m) as applied and the burden allocation when a child has already been adjudicated uncared for).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commissioner) | Defendant's Argument (Jonathan S.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of motion to revoke without an adjudicative fitness hearing violated procedural due process | Procedures in §46b‑129(m) and Practice Book §35a‑14A provide adequate process; movant bears burden to show cause for commitment no longer exists | Jonathan argued he was entitled to a presumption of fitness and an adjudicative hearing where the Commissioner would bear burden to prove unfitness | Court held no procedural due process violation: existing statutory revocation process and the hearings Jonathan received satisfied Mathews balancing; Stanley inapplicable |
| Whether §46b‑129(m) as applied violated substantive due process by placing burden on parent to show cause no longer exists | State has compelling interest in protecting a child already adjudicated uncared for; statute appropriately allocates initial burden to movant | Jonathan argued his fundamental parental right required presumption of fitness and that state must prove unfitness or imminent harm | Court held no substantive due process violation: where child was previously adjudicated uncared for and in Commissioner custody nearly two years, parent is not entitled to presumption of fitness and statute’s allocation is constitutional |
| Whether Stanley v. Illinois or Troxel v. Granville require a different process when a biological parent later appears | Commissioner: those precedents do not control where a child already was adjudicated uncared for and committed before paternity was established | Jonathan: relied on Stanley/Troxel to demand a fitness hearing and presumption of parental fitness | Court distinguished Stanley and Troxel; required only opportunity to be heard (which Jonathan received) and applied Mathews balancing |
| Whether factual findings supported denial of revocation (safety, bonding, noncompliance) | Department presented evidence of noncompliance, unsafe choices, poor bonding, anger issues, and refusal to follow professional recommendations | Jonathan asserted he was willing and able to care for child and had begun services | Court credited record evidence that cause for commitment remained and found respondent failed to meet burden; denial affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (balancing test for procedural due process)
- Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (unwed father entitled to fitness hearing where custody interrupted without process)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (parental presumption of fitness and protection of parental decisionmaking)
- State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (standards for appellate review of unpreserved constitutional claims)
- In re David L., 54 Conn. App. 185 (Connecticut precedent on adjudication focusing on child’s status rather than parental fault)
- Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202 (state may infringe parental rights only to prevent compelling harm)