In re Williams, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19732

Anthony Williams, a felon in possession, received a 15-year sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on three predicate Texas convictions, including a 1985 robbery.
The ACCA defines “violent felony” with an elements clause and a residual clause covering crimes that "otherwise involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury."
In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held the ACCA residual clause unconstitutionally vague.
Williams previously filed and lost a § 2255 habeas petition before Johnson; he sought authorization to file a successive § 2255 petition relying on Johnson.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) and § 2244(b)(2), authorization for a successive petition requires a prima facie showing that the claim relies on a new constitutional rule made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.
The Fifth Circuit concluded Johnson announced a new rule but held it is not retroactive on collateral review under Teague, so Williams’ motion for authorization to file a successive petition was denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Johnson announce a new rule of constitutional law?	Johnson broke new ground by invalidating the ACCA residual clause; thus it is a new rule.	(Government implicitly) Johnson was not dictated by precedent, but the government contests retroactivity rather than newness.	Held: Johnson is a new rule.
Is Johnson retroactive on collateral review under Teague?	Williams: Johnson should be retroactive as a substantive rule invalidating the residual clause.	The government: Johnson is not a watershed procedural rule and does not prohibit punishment of conduct categorically; thus not retroactive.	Held: Johnson is not retroactive under Teague.
Does Johnson qualify as a "substantive rule" exception to Teague?	Williams: Johnson removes the legal basis for certain ACCA penalties, creating a significant risk defendants face unlawful punishment.	Court: Johnson requires clarity but does not deprive Congress of power to impose the same punishment with clearer language; it alters sentencing structure, not substantive power.	Held: Johnson is not a substantive Teague exception.
Did Williams make the prima facie showing required to authorize a successive § 2255?	Williams: Johnson entitles him to relief because one predicate (robbery) depended on the residual clause.	Court: Because Johnson is not retroactive, Williams cannot meet the prima facie requirement.	Held: Motion for authorization to file a successive § 2255 petition denied.

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework restricting retroactivity of new rules on collateral review)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (substantive rules that remove authority to impose punishment are retroactive)
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (statutory-interpretation decisions and actual-innocence considerations; not governed by Teague in same way)
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (statutory interpretation of "use" of a firearm; distinguished from Johnson)
Price v. United States, 795 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015) (granted successive § 2255 relief based on Johnson)
In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 2015) (denied successive relief; reasoning aligned with this court)
In re Gieswein, 802 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2015) (denied successive relief under Johnson)
Pakala v. United States, 804 F.3d 139 (1st Cir. 2015) (granted successive petition under Johnson)