In re Williams, 101 A.3d 151

Petitioner, a building resident, pled guilty to four counts of involuntary manslaughter for a fatal fire; age nineteen at the time of offense.
PCR court found pre-plea representation adequate but sentenced counsel’s performance during sentencing below professional standards, prejudicing petitioner.
Fire originated in petitioner’s room; three children and grandmother died after the blaze spread via a wooden exterior staircase.
Defense hired initially a fire expert who sided with the police conclusion; later a different expert offered an electrical-origin theory favorable to petitioner.
Plea agreement amended arson charges to involuntary manslaughter with a 40–60 year standard range; minimum could be as low as 20 years under the deal.
PCR court vacated petitioner’s sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing; appellate court affirmed, directing resentencing before a different judge to avoid prejudice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Pre-plea counsel’s failure to investigate fire cause	Petitioner argues counsel should have hired independent fire expert	Defense contends existing expert was reasonable and no duty to shop for better testimony	No deficient performance foreseen; reasonable to rely on hired expert
Multiplicity of arson counts	Counts were duplicative for a single act of setting the fire	Statute tied to victims allowed multiple counts for multiple deaths	Counsel not ineffective; Senna controls and supports multiplicity here
Advice to plead guilty	Counsel failed to adequately prepare, undermining plea strategy	Counsel conducted depositions, hired experts, and advised plea based on strong case	Petitioner failed to show deficient pre-plea preparation; plea informed
Prejudice standard at sentencing	Counsel’s poor sentencing conduct prejudiced outcome; presumptive prejudice under Cronic	Standard Strickland prejudice applies; no presumptive prejudice	Cronic presumption rejected; actual prejudice shown by Strickland standard; remand for resentencing required
Remand court to avoid prejudice	New resentencing before different judge required to ensure fairness	No need to recuse judge; prejudice already proven	Remand to a different judge for resentencing required

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1984) (establishes two-prong prejudice standard for ineffective assistance)
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1984) (presumption of prejudice only for complete failure to test the case)
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2002) (Cronic narrow exception; requires actual prejudice absent complete failure)
In re Pernicka, 147 Vt. 183 (Vt. 1986) (Strickland prejudice framework adopted in Vermont)
State v. Koons, 2011 VT 22 (Vt. 2011) (remand for resentencing before different judge to avoid prejudice)
State v. LaBounty, 2005 VT 124 (Vt. 2005) (articulates when multiple counts may or may not be proper)
State v. Williams, 137 Vt. 360 (Vt. 1979) (sentencing considerations in Vermont cases)
State v. Meunier, 145 Vt. 414 (Vt. 1985) (principles for remand and prejudice considerations)
State v. Neale, 145 Vt. 423 (Vt. 1985) (remand for resentencing when due process concerns arise)
United States v. Theodore, 468 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2006) (distinguishes complete failure from partial ineffective assistance)
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2009) (reasserts requiring prejudice showing for sentencing claims)