34 Cal. App. 5th 933
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2019Background
- Gregory White was convicted of second-degree felony murder and methamphetamine manufacture after an explosion during a meth "pull" from Coleman fuel killed his accomplice; he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 19 years to life.
- At trial the jury found the killing occurred during the commission of manufacturing methamphetamine and that it was not committed with implied malice; the prosecution relied on the felony-murder theory.
- Trial and appellate records included expert testimony on methamphetamine production steps, hazards (flammable solvents, acids, red phosphorus, etc.), and investigator testimony that lab fires/explosions occur with measurable frequency (trial testimony cited a ~1-in-5 fire/explosion rate).
- White sought habeas relief after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States (invalidating ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague), arguing Johnson (and subsequent decisions) rendered California’s second-degree felony-murder rule void for vagueness as applied to meth manufacture.
- The trial court (and this Court on review) relied on People v. James and other authority and the case-specific expert evidence to conclude manufacturing methamphetamine is inherently dangerous to human life; the habeas petition was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson’s vagueness holding (invalidating a residual, categorical test) renders California’s second‑degree felony‑murder rule unconstitutional as applied to White | White: Johnson requires invalidation because California’s rule depends on a judicially imagined abstraction of the offense and an indeterminate risk standard | State: California’s approach here rested on concrete, expert, real‑world evidence about meth production (not the speculative categorical method Johnson condemned) | Denied: on this record Johnson does not require reversal; the court relied on evidence showing meth manufacture is inherently dangerous |
| Whether manufacturing methamphetamine is "inherently dangerous to human life" for second‑degree felony‑murder purposes | White: (as‑applied) argues the abstract test is vague and some methods might be relatively safe | State: expert testimony and precedent (People v. James) establish the manufacturing process (including "pulling" from solvents) carries a high probability of death | Held: the court affirmed that, based on trial experts and James precedent, manufacturing meth in unprofessional labs is inherently dangerous and supports felony murder |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (U.S. 2015) (ACCA residual‑clause holding: categorical "ordinary‑case" + indeterminate risk standard is unconstitutionally vague)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (U.S. 2018) (applies Johnson vagueness analysis to 18 U.S.C. §16(b))
- People v. James, 62 Cal.App.4th 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (manufacturing methamphetamine held inherently dangerous to human life; courts may consider expert evidence)
- People v. Chun, 45 Cal.4th 1172 (Cal. 2009) (discusses felony‑murder framework and distinction between enumerated first‑degree felonies and other inherently dangerous felonies)
- People v. Howard, 34 Cal.4th 1129 (Cal. 2005) (explains abstract/elements‑based inquiry for "inherently dangerous" and that some offenses may be committed without high risk of death)
- People v. Patterson, 49 Cal.3d 615 (Cal. 1989) (establishes "high probability" standard and permits remand for evidentiary development on inherent dangerousness)
- People v. Hansen, 9 Cal.4th 300 (Cal. 1994) (example of felony found inherently dangerous: shooting at an inhabited dwelling)
- People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal.3d 824 (Cal. 1984) (example of felony not inherently dangerous where non‑lethal variants are possible)
- Henry v. Spearman, 899 F.3d 703 (9th Cir. 2018) (held Johnson claim was a plausible basis to authorize a successive federal habeas filing)