In re Watkins
810 F.3d 375
6th Cir.2015Background
- Watkins, federally convicted in 2005 for being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), received a 185‑month sentence under the ACCA based on prior convictions for arson, felony escape, and voluntary manslaughter.
- She filed a timely direct appeal (affirmed) and certiorari was denied in 2007; her conviction became final then.
- Watkins previously filed an untimely § 2255 motion in 2011 challenging whether arson qualified as an ACCA violent felony; it was denied as untimely.
- In 2014 she sought authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 petition arguing Descamps undermined her felony escape predicate; the motion was transferred to the Sixth Circuit for authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2).
- After the Sixth Circuit docketed the motion, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States (holding ACCA’s residual clause void for vagueness); Watkins moved to supplement her claim based on Johnson.
- The Sixth Circuit concluded Watkins made a prima facie showing that Johnson announced a new constitutional rule, made retroactive to collateral cases by the Supreme Court, and granted authorization to file a successive § 2255 petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Watkins) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson announced a new rule of constitutional law for § 2255(h)(2) purposes | Johnson overruled prior cases and announced a new due‑process rule invalidating ACCA’s residual clause | Johnson overruled prior precedent and therefore constitutes a new rule; the government conceded Watkins cleared the new‑rule hurdle | Held: Johnson is a new constitutional rule (explicitly overruled prior Supreme Court holdings) |
| Whether Johnson is retroactive on collateral review under § 2255(h)(2) | Johnson is a substantive rule that prohibits imposing ACCA’s enhanced punishment when predicates rest only on the residual clause, thus made retroactive by the Supreme Court | Government conceded retroactivity for purposes of authorization and urged expedited review; argued Watkins made prima facie showing | Held: Johnson is retroactively applicable as a substantive rule that forbids a category of punishment tied to the residual clause |
| Whether Watkins made a prima facie showing to permit a second or successive § 2255 petition | Her ACCA status depended on predicates that may only qualify under the residual clause (e.g., felony escape), so Johnson potentially invalidates her sentence | Government agreed Watkins showed possible merit and urged authorization to allow merits review by district court | Held: Authorized — Watkins made the prima facie showing required to file a successive § 2255 petition |
| Whether Teague/retroactivity doctrine bars relief | Teague permits retroactive application of new substantive rules; Johnson qualifies as such and therefore fits the exception | Some circuits argued Johnson might be non‑retroactive or only procedural; but those defenses do not defeat a prima facie showing here | Held: Under Teague framework, Johnson is a substantive rule that should be considered retroactive on collateral review |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (U.S. 2015) (ACCA residual clause void for vagueness; increased sentence under it violates due process)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (framework for retroactivity of new constitutional rules on collateral review)
- Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (U.S. 2013) (definition of when a case announces a new rule)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (U.S. 2004) (distinction between substantive and procedural rules for retroactivity)
- Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (U.S. 2001) (explanation of how Supreme Court holdings can ‘make’ a rule retroactive)
- Price v. United States, 795 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding Johnson announces a new rule and is categorically retroactive)
- In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 2015) (addressing whether Johnson is substantive and the retroactivity question)
- In re Williams, 806 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2015) (discussing whether Johnson announces a substantive rule and its retroactivity)
- In re Liddell, 722 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2013) (procedural guidance on § 2255(h)(2) authorization standard)