In re: Warren Lee Hill, Jr.
777 F.3d 1214
11th Cir.2015Background
- Warren Hill murdered a fellow inmate in 1990; he was convicted of malice murder and sentenced to death after a unanimous jury verdict.
- Hill did not assert intellectual disability at trial or on direct appeal; counsel had a 1991 evaluation concluding he was not intellectually disabled, but later claims began in 1996.
- Georgia law (O.C.G.A. §17-7-131) bars executing intellectually disabled persons but required Hill to prove disability beyond a reasonable doubt; his IQs ranged roughly 69–77 and his adaptive-functioning evidence was disputed.
- State habeas proceedings (including remand and evidentiary hearings) and state appellate review repeatedly found Hill failed to prove adaptive deficits beyond a reasonable doubt; Georgia courts upheld the burden and procedures.
- Hill pursued multiple federal habeas petitions and successive‑petition applications; the Eleventh Circuit (en banc and subsequent panels) denied relief under AEDPA and §2244(b), holding prior claims/bar rules and precedent foreclosed his Hall-based challenge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hill may file a successive §2254 claim asserting intellectual disability based on Hall | Hill: Hall created a new rule entitling him to raise a successive claim; Georgia’s reasonable‑doubt rule violates Atkins/Hall and risks executing the intellectually disabled | State: Hill’s claim was presented before; §2244(b)(1) bars successive presentation of the same claim; Hall does not help because Georgia permits adaptive‑behavior evidence and Hill already litigated it | Denied — claim barred under §2244(b)(1) as not new; application to file successive petition denied |
| Whether Hall announced a new rule retroactive on collateral review under §2244(b)(2)(A) | Hill: Hall’s rule should apply and allow collateral relief | State: Hall is not a Supreme Court‑made‑retroactive rule; In re Henry controls | Denied — Hall is a new rule but not made retroactive by the Supreme Court; panel bound by In re Henry |
| Whether Hall materially affects Georgia’s beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt burden | Hill: Reasonable‑doubt standard creates unacceptable risk of executing the intellectually disabled, akin to Florida’s rule struck down in Hall | State: Georgia’s statute differs from Florida’s rigid IQ cutoff; Georgia allows adaptive‑behavior evidence and provided full proceedings | Denied — even if Hall were retroactive, Hall addressed Florida’s cutoff, not Georgia’s burden; Hall would not change result here |
| Whether Sawyer’s "actual innocence of the death penalty" or §2244(b)(2)(B) permit a successive sentencing‑claim petition | Hill: Sawyer or newly discovered evidence of disability establishes actual‑innocence-of‑sentence exception | State: AEDPA eliminated Sawyer exception; §2244(b)(2)(B) applies to convictions (guilt), not pure sentencing claims | Denied — Sawyer exception rejected by Eleventh Circuit precedent; §2244(b)(2)(B) cannot be used to reopen a pure sentencing claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (Eighth Amendment bars execution of intellectually disabled persons; left procedures to states)
- Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014) (state may not apply a rigid IQ cutoff that forecloses adaptive‑behavior evidence)
- Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (AEDPA limits federal review; Georgia’s burden‑of‑proof challenge rejected)
- In re Hill, 715 F.3d 284 (11th Cir. 2013) (denying application to file successive §2254 petition)
- In re Henry, 757 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2014) (Hall is a new rule but not made retroactive by the Supreme Court for collateral review)
- Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (pre‑AEDPA standard for showing actual innocence of the death penalty)
- Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (framework for AEDPA gatekeeping and jurisdictional limits)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (retroactivity of new rules on collateral review)