In Re Vehicle Carrier Services Antitrust Litigation
846 F.3d 71
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs (direct purchasers and indirect purchasers of vehicles) sued ocean common carriers alleging secret agreements to fix prices, allocate customers/routes, and restrict capacity for vehicle carriage to/from the U.S. that inflated prices. Several carriers pled guilty in criminal antitrust investigations.
- Plaintiffs sought damages under the Clayton Act (Sherman Act claims) and, for IPPs, state-law antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust-enrichment relief.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the Shipping Act provides the exclusive federal framework (including antitrust immunities/restrictions and FMC enforcement) and that state-law claims are preempted.
- The District Court dismissed the complaints with prejudice, concluding the Shipping Act barred private Clayton Act suits for conduct prohibited by the Act and preempted IPPs’ state-law claims; it also denied IPPs’ motion for reconsideration to retain jurisdiction to approve class settlements.
- The Third Circuit affirmed: Clayton Act damages barred where conduct falls within Shipping Act prohibitions; IPPs’ state-law claims conflict-preempted because they would obstruct Congress’s uniform regulatory scheme and FMC’s enforcement role.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs may recover Clayton Act damages for conduct the Shipping Act prohibits (e.g., operating under unfiled agreements) | Clayton Act remedies remain available; Shipping Act does not displace federal antitrust remedies for all carrier misconduct | The Shipping Act forbids operation under unfiled/ineffective agreements and §40307(d) bars Clayton Act damages for conduct prohibited by the Act | Held for Defendants: Clayton Act damages are barred for conduct prohibited by the Shipping Act; dismissal proper |
| Whether agreements to restrict capacity are within the Shipping Act’s filing/prohibition scheme | Capacity-restriction agreements fall outside the Act (citing an FMC commissioner’s remark) | Sections 40301(a)(3)-(4) explicitly require filing of agreements that regulate voyages and cargo volume; unfiled agreements are prohibited | Held for Defendants: capacity-restriction agreements are covered by the Act and unfiled ones are prohibited |
| Whether IPPs’ state-law antitrust, consumer-protection, and unjust-enrichment claims are preempted | State laws should supplement federal protections; FMC process does not preclude state remedies | Allowing state claims would create parallel/contrary regulation and frustrate the Shipping Act’s objective of uniform federal regulation and antitrust immunity scheme | Held for Defendants: conflict preemption applies; IPPs’ state-law claims are preempted because they obstruct federal scheme and FMC’s exclusive role |
| Whether the District Court abused discretion in denying reconsideration to retain jurisdiction to approve settlements | IPPs asked court to retain jurisdiction to approve class settlements with two defendants and sought reconsideration | Defendants contended no basis for reconsideration; IPPs had not filed approval motions or shown intervening law/evidence or manifest injustice | Held for Defendants: denial of reconsideration was not an abuse of discretion; IPPs failed to meet Rule 59(e)/60(b) criteria |
Key Cases Cited
- Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor v. Elizabeth-Newark Shipping, Inc., 164 F.3d 177 (3d Cir.) (discussing Shipping Act purpose to eliminate discriminatory treatment)
- A & E Pacific Constr. Co. v. Saipan Stevedore Co., 888 F.2d 68 (9th Cir.) (FMC provides corrective remedies and private antitrust suits barred for conduct under Shipping Act)
- Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743 (Sup. Ct.) (parallels between FMC proceedings and civil litigation)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (Sup. Ct.) (agency interpretations entitled to deference when official)
- United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (Sup. Ct.) (maritime commerce regulation is predominantly federal; presumption against preemption weaker)
- Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (Sup. Ct.) (state-law claims that conflict with federal regulatory balance are preempted)
- Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97 (3d Cir.) (conflict preemption where state rules upset federal regulatory balance)