in Re: Tony R. Saad
05-15-00104-CV
| Tex. App. | Feb 6, 2015Background
- Tony R. Saad obtained a Final Decree of divorce; the decree was entered and the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction expired before November 2, 2014.
- Jeffrey O. Anderson (former counsel for one spouse) received a pre-decree award by the associate judge ordering the father to pay the mother’s attorney fees directly to the mother’s attorneys.
- Anderson did not file a formal motion to intervene before the Final Decree and later withdrew as counsel.
- After entry of the decree Anderson filed post-decree pleadings, including a Motion for New Trial and motions to render judgment on attorney’s fees.
- Relator Saad argues those post-decree filings, made by a non-party, did not extend the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction because the decree was not set aside within 30 days; he seeks mandamus to vacate the court’s later rulings granting a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Anderson) | Defendant's Argument (Saad/Relator) | Held/Controlling Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the associate judge’s interim attorneys’‑fee award make Anderson a party of record? | The fee award (and statutory ability to collect in the attorney’s name) made Anderson effectively a party and thus his post‑decree motions could extend jurisdiction. | The award created a creditor relationship but did not make Anderson a party; intervention is required to become a party of record. | Award did not make him a party; fee enforcement rights do not substitute for intervention. |
| Can equitable doctrines (invited error/equitable estoppel) or counsel‑related fairness grounds extend a court’s plenary jurisdiction? | Tony invited the error or should be equitably estopped from challenging post‑decree actions. | Equity cannot create or extend subject‑matter/plenary jurisdiction; invited error does not restore lost plenary power. | Equity/estoppel cannot confer or restore plenary jurisdiction once expired. |
| Do post‑decree motions recharacterized as motions to modify under Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(g) by a non‑party extend plenary jurisdiction? | Recasting the filings as Rule 329b(g) motions to modify suffices to extend jurisdiction. | Recharacterization is unnecessary and irrelevant because Anderson was not a party; there is no authority that a non‑party’s 329b(g) motion extends plenary jurisdiction. | A non‑party’s post‑decree motions do not extend plenary jurisdiction; being a party is prerequisite. |
| Is post‑judgment intervention effective if the decree is not set aside within 30 days? | Post‑decree intervention or relief can be allowed; several exceptions apply (including subrogation analogies). | Under Malone and related authority, a post‑judgment intervention only preserves rights if the underlying decree is set aside within the initial 30‑day plenary window; absent that, later actions are void. | The decree was not set aside within 30 days; thus post‑decree intervention/motions did not extend plenary jurisdiction and subsequent orders are void. |
Key Cases Cited
- Malone v. Hampton, 182 S.W.3d 465 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006) (post‑judgment intervention by non‑party does not extend plenary power unless judgment is set aside within 30 days)
- Texas Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ledbetter, 251 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. 2008) (subrogee‑intervention rule limited to subrogation context where interests were abandoned)
- In the Interest of H.G., 267 S.W.3d 120 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008) (equity cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists)
- Serna v. Webster, 908 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995) (intervention is appropriate vehicle for discharged attorney to recover fees; interventions must be timely)
- In re Florence, 377 S.W.3d 837 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012) (orders without subject‑matter jurisdiction are void)
- Daniels v. Pecan Valley Ranch, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992) (doctrine of invited error discussed)
- First Alief Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1982) (intervention after judgment comes too late unless judgment is set aside)