In the Interest of H.G., K.G., J.G., and T.G., Children.
No. 04-07-00656-CV
Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio
June 11, 2008
267 S.W.3d 120
ALMA L. LOPEZ, Chief Justice, PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN, Justice, STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice.
Michael D. Bowles, San Antonio, TX, Bruce Gibbens, Cibolo, TX, for appellee.
Sitting: ALMA L. LOPEZ, Chief Justice, PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN, Justice, STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice.
OPINION ON APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING
Opinion by: STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice.
On April 23, 2008, we issued an opinion and judgment affirming the trial court‘s judgment. Appellants Deborah and Donald Glynn have filed a motion for rehearing. We deny the motion but withdraw our April 23, 2008 opinion and issue this opinion in its place. Our April 23, 2008 judgment remains unchanged.
This is an appeal from a trial court‘s dismissal of a petition in intervention for lack of standing. The only issue is whether the trial court properly concluded that the defense of estoppel or quasi-estoppel is inapplicable when the Texas Legislature has declined to confer standing on a party and, in fact, has statutorily precluded such standing. We affirm the trial court‘s decision.
BACKGROUND
The parental rights of the biological parents of H.G., K.G., J.G., and T.G. (“the children“) were terminated. Before the termination Donald and Deborah Glynn, who are the biological maternal grandparents of the children, were named managing conservators. After the termination, Lori and Bruce Gibbens adopted the children with the Glynns’ consent. In November of 2005, more than two years after the final adoption, Lori Gibbens filed for divorce and a final decree was entered in March of 2006. The decree named the Gibbenses joint managing conservators of the children.
Approximately eight months after the final decree was entered, the Glynns filed an “Intervenor‘s [sic] Petition for Modification of Parent-Child Relationship to Provide Grandparent Access”1 by which they sought an order permitting them “possession of or access to the children.” The Glynns claimed the Gibbenses secured the Glynns’ consent to the adoption by promising the Glynns could continue visitation with the children after the adoption. Lori Gibbens filed a motion to strike the intervention, contending the Glynns lacked standing and there was no basis in law for their argument regarding quasi-estoppel.
ANALYSIS
Because the Glynns were managing conservators at the time of the adoption, their consent was part of the adoption process. See
Under the principles of estoppel and quasi-estoppel, [Lori] should be estopped from denying that [the Glynns] have standing to ask for access to these children, because [Lori] promised [the Glynns] that they would continue to have a relationship with the children, and [the Glynns] acted on that promise to their detriment. Furthermore, [Lori] has continued to allow [the Glynns] to have limited contact with the children, and it would not be in the children‘s best interest to discontinue that contact.
In this appeal, the Glynns assert the trial court erred in concluding their theory of estoppel or quasi-estoppel was inapplicable and could not confer standing in this matter. The Glynns argue the trial court had the equitable authority to estop the Gibbenses from asserting an absence of standing because they made misrepresentations to the Glynns to secure the consent to the adoption and without the Glynns’ consent the adoption may have not occurred.
In her motion to strike the Glynns’ intervention, Lori Gibbens contended that section 153.434 of the Texas Family Code precluded the Glynns’ suit:
A biological or adoptive grandparent may not request possession of or access to a grandchild if:
(1) each of the biological parents of the grandchild has:
* * *
(B) had the person‘s parental rights terminated ... and
(2) the grandchild has been adopted, or is subject of a pending suit for adoption, by a person other than the child‘s stepparent.
“When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” Everett v. TK-Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); see Tex. Dep‘t of Prot. and Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2001) (reviewing applicable standing provisions in Texas Family Code to determine whether purported father had standing); In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33, 34-35 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (holding that to determine whether sperm donor had standing to file suit to
We recognize that courts, including this court, have applied the doctrine of estoppel or quasi-estoppel in various contexts, including suits relating to the parent-child relationship. See, e.g., In re A.L.G., 229 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (applying doctrine of quasi-estoppel to bar ex-wife from recovering child support arrearage); Hausman v. Hausman, 199 S.W.3d 38, 42-43 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.); In re Shockley, 123 S.W.3d 642, 651-53 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.) (applying equitable estoppel to preclude mother from litigating child‘s parentage). And, in Hausman, we held, in the context of paternity and citing a supreme court case involving copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation, a trial court can apply equitable principles to estop a defendant from relying on a statutory bar to recovery. 199 S.W.3d at 43 (citing Computer Assocs. Int‘l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex. 1996)). However, neither Hausman nor any of the other cases relied upon by the Glynns have held that estoppel can be used to confer standing where none exists under the legislative framework.
Standing is not merely a “statutory bar.” Rather, standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Ass‘n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444-45 (Tex. 1993). Subject matter jurisdiction “‘involves a court‘s power to hear a case.‘” Tellez v. City of Socorro, 226 S.W.3d 413, 413 (Tex. 2007) (quoting U.S. v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). For a court to act, it must have subject matter jurisdiction. See Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990). Any judicial action by a court without jurisdiction is void. Id. Subject matter jurisdiction exists by operation of law and cannot be conferred or taken away by consent or waiver. Tex. Ass‘n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444-45; Fed. Underwriters Exch. v. Pugh, 141 Tex. 539, 174 S.W.2d 598, 600 (1943). Nor can subject matter jurisdiction be conferred by estoppel. Taub v. Aquila S.W. Pipeline Corp., 93 S.W.3d 451, 461 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). An absence of standing deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and renders any trial court action void. Id.
Consequently, while equity may estop a party from relying on a mere
The dissent relies upon the principle of quasi-estoppel to suggest the Glynns have standing in this matter. To support its contention, the dissent first declares that “this court‘s equity jurisdiction can be used to estop a party from arguing that another party lacks standing.” In support of this statement the dissent cites Eckland Consultants, Inc. v. Ryder, Stilwell Inc., 176 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) and Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 242 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. filed). In Eckland Consultants, the court held a party was estopped from arguing an absence of standing because it had accepted benefits under the contract it was attempting to use to deny standing. 176 S.W.3d at 87-88. In Paradigm Oil, this court held that where all allegations in a petition, including those that established standing, were deemed admitted as a result of a default judgment, the defaulting party was estopped from denying the plaintiff‘s standing. 242 S.W.3d at 71-72. Neither Eckland Consultants nor Paradigm Oil holds that estoppel can confer standing, i.e., subject matter jurisdiction where none exists. While estoppel may preclude parties from arguing facts that negate standing, it cannot confer jurisdiction. See Tex. Ass‘n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444-45; Taub, 93 S.W.3d at 461.
The dissent also challenges the majority‘s statement that the Glynns’ consent “was part of the adoption process,” seemingly suggesting the adoption could not have proceeded without it and the Glynns are therefore entitled, under principles of equity, to standing in this matter. We respectfully disagree with the dissent‘s interpretation of section 162.010. Section 162.010, while entitled “Consent Required” and stating “the written consent of a managing conservator to the adoption must be filed,” also provides that the court can waive the consent requirement if, in addition to other factors, the court finds “the consent is being refused or has been revoked without good cause.”
Finally, we agree with the dissent that the Glynns had standing before the adoption to seek continued possession and access to the children. See
CONCLUSION
Whether the Glynns have standing under the Texas Family Code must be determined under the Texas Family Code. See Sherry, 46 S.W.3d at 861; H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d at 34-35; Everett, 178 S.W.3d at 851. Because they do not have standing and because estoppel cannot be used to confer jurisdiction, the trial court did not err in dismissing the Glynns’ petition in intervention. See
In the Interest of H.G., K.G., J.G., and T.G., Children.
No. 04-07-00656-CV
Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio
June 11, 2008
Dissenting opinion by: ALMA L. LOPEZ, Chief Justice.
ALMA L. LOPEZ, Chief Justice, dissenting.
Section 153.432 of the Texas Family Code authorizes biological or adoptive grandparents to request possession of or access to a grandchild.
As this court has recognized, a trial court‘s equitable power is expansive, particularly in cases in which the best interest of a child is in question:
The equitable power of a court is not bound by cast-iron rules but exists to do fairness and is flexible and adaptable to particular exigencies so that relief will be granted when, in view of all the circumstances, to deny it would permit one party to suffer a gross wrong at the hands of the other.
Hausman v. Hausman, 199 S.W.3d 38, 42 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.); see also Leithold v. Plass, 413 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. 1967) (noting courts are given wide discretion in possession and visitation matters involving children). Quasi-estoppel is an equitable doctrine that operates as an affirmative defense. Hamilton v. Morris Resources, Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. denied). Quasi-estoppel applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent with the one in which he acquiesced or accepted a benefit. In re A.L.G., 229 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.). Quasi-estoppel precludes a party from asserting, to another‘s
Because the Glynns were the managing conservators at the time of the children‘s adoption, their consent was not simply “part of the adoption process” as stated by the majority. Instead, the Glynns’ consent to the adoption was statutorily required.
I note that the trial court‘s application of quasi-estoppel to find the Glynns had standing would mean only that the Glynns have the right to be heard, not the right to win. See Whitworth v. Whitworth, 222 S.W.3d 616, 622 n. 3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see also