In re the Welfare of B.A.H.
2014 Minn. LEXIS 192
| Minn. | 2014Background
- In Sept. 2011, 14-year-old B.A.H. (first cousin) initiated and performed sexual acts (fellatio and anal intercourse) on 13-year-old X.X., who resisted and later reported the conduct.
- X.X. was younger than 16; both are first cousins; B.A.H. supplied alcohol, initiated conduct, and threatened X.X. to keep silent.
- State charged B.A.H. under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(g) (first-degree criminal sexual conduct where actor has a "significant relationship" and complainant is under 16); consent is not a defense.
- B.A.H. moved to dismiss arguing the statute was unconstitutionally vague and violated due process and equal protection as applied (because the statute could technically apply to both participants).
- District court found him delinquent after stipulated bench trial; Court of Appeals reversed on due process and equal protection grounds; Minnesota Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | B.A.H.'s Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vagueness / Due process: Does § 609.342(1)(g) encourage arbitrary enforcement because both participants could be labeled actor/complainant? | Statute affords no guidance to distinguish actor vs. complainant; allows discriminatory enforcement. | Statute defines prohibited conduct and relationships (fellatio/anal intercourse with a first cousin under 16); it provides adequate notice and limits discretion. | Reversed Court of Appeals: statute not unconstitutionally vague as applied; conduct and covered relationships are sufficiently defined. |
| Equal protection: Is charging B.A.H. but not X.X. invidious discrimination under Equal Protection? | Charging only one participant when statute can apply to both is discriminatory enforcement per se. | Prosecutorial discretion may rationally target the initiator/perpetrator; State had rational reasons (initiated conduct, supplied alcohol, prior conduct, threats). | Charging decision was rationally based on permissible factors; no equal protection violation. |
| Scope of statutory terms (actor/complainant): Does the statute’s definitions render both juveniles equally culpable? | Both technically violate the statute since each is a first cousin who engaged in sexual penetration. | "Actor" means the person accused; complainant means person alleged to have been subjected to conduct—X.X. is victim/complainant, B.A.H. is actor. | Court rejects per se technicality; statutory definitions and charging context distinguish actor (accused) from complainant (alleged victim). |
| Precedent requiring uniform enforcement: Do prior cases (e.g., Vadnais, In re D.B.) control to require charging both or neither? | Reliance on cases like In re D.B. supports requiring symmetrical charging or finds vagueness. | Those cases are distinguishable; selective enforcement is unconstitutional only when unjustified or arbitrary. | Court declines to follow Ohio decision; selective enforcement constitutional where prosecutor offers rational, permissible reasons. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (vagueness doctrine: statutes must provide minimal guidelines to limit enforcement discretion)
- City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (ordinance unconstitutionally vague where it left enforcement to unfettered police discretion)
- Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) (vagueness invalid where law left enforcers free to decide what is prohibited)
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (criminal culpability cannot depend on wholly subjective judgments without statutory narrowing)
- State v. Becker, 351 N.W.2d 923 (Minn. 1984) (statute not vague where it clearly defines prohibited sexual conduct and covered persons)
- State v. Bussmann, 741 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 2007) (vagueness analysis: statute must define offense with sufficient definiteness)
- In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile proceedings require due process essentials)
- Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) (selective enforcement not unconstitutional if based on rational prosecutorial reasons)
- State v. Anderson, 159 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1968) (prosecutor may consider relative culpability and other factors in charging decisions)
- Vadnais v. State, 202 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1972) (selective nonenforcement violates equal protection when officials intentionally or systematically discriminate)