In re the Search of Black Iphone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74

Six search-and-seizure warrant applications sought to search six electronic devices seized from a hotel room in Solomons, Maryland, in a child-pornography investigation.
The six applications relied on the same affidavit and identical Attachment B (“Specific Items to Be Seized”), a boilerplate list drafted for cell phones.
Three applications targeted cell phones; three targeted hard drives; the Attachment B language was only appropriate to cell phones.
Attachment B sought broad categories of data (contacts, messages, images, voicemail, internet activity, passwords, and all visual depictions of minors).
The court found (1) maladapted boilerplate used for hard drives, (2) several seizure categories were overbroad for the charged offenses, and (3) the government failed to describe a search protocol or the disposition of data outside the warrant’s scope.
The court denied the applications without prejudice, directing the government to tailor Attachment B, show probable cause for each category, and describe search and handling protocols for intermingled electronic data.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Use of inaccurate boilerplate Attachment B for hard drives	Attachment B correctly describes items to be seized	Attachment B is generic cell-phone language but was used for hard drives	Denied: boilerplate wrong for hard drives; warrants rejected for those applications
Overbreadth of seized data	Broad seizure of contacts, messages, images, voicemail etc. is justified by child-pornography probe	Government claimed probable cause for listed items generally	Denied: several categories (contacts, all messages, images, voicemail) not tied to probable cause; must be limited to items related to §§2252/2252A offenses
Need for search protocol when electronic data already seized	No protocol required; standard warrant suffices	Government must explain how digital search will proceed to avoid wholesale rummaging	Denied absent protocol: government must state imaging, who will search, criteria to avoid viewing unrelated data
Disposition of nonresponsive/seized-but-irrelevant data	Government may retain seized data for investigation	Court demands return or destruction plan for data outside warrant scope	Denied: government must specify prompt return or destruction of irrelevant data (or justify alternative), or application will be rejected

United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982) (approving sealing and magistrate review when documents intermingled)
United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006) (government should justify wholesale seizure; favors inclusion of search protocol)
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (concerns over overseizure; segregation/redaction by independent or specialized personnel)
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (seizure occurs when possession is meaningfully interfered with)
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (Fourth Amendment prohibits general exploratory rummaging)
United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2013) (expressing concern that identifying/separating electronic data can expose protected material)
United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2011) (warrants must be limited to evidence of specified crimes to avoid free-ranging searches)
United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009) (computer-search warrants must limit the search to evidence of specific crimes)