In Re the Marriage of Wollert
464 P.3d 703
Colo.2020Background
- Marriage dissolution case active ~14+ years; parties dispute parenting of their son (age 13) with extensive litigation and professional involvement (CFIs, PRE, reintegration therapists).
- Court-ordered reintegration therapy: first Dr. Darr (ended 2018), then Sharon Feder (appointed 2018) who in Nov. 2019 issued a detailed treatment summary concluding Mother engaged in "severe parental alienation" and that the child was "in imminent psychological and emotional danger."
- Father filed a verified emergency motion to restrict parenting time under § 14-10-129(4), incorporating Feder’s Summary and requesting a hearing within 14 days; Mother opposed and submitted a contrary therapist letter.
- The magistrate denied the motion without a hearing, applying the Colorado Court of Appeals’ Slowinski standard (facial insufficiency: no set of facts could show imminent danger); the district court adopted that order.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted original review, rejected Slowinski, held that C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1)’s particularity requirement governs § 14-10-129(4) motions, found Father’s motion sufficiently particular, and remanded for a 14-day hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard for when § 14-10-129(4) requires a hearing within 14 days | Father: Apply C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1) — motion must state grounds with particularity; if so, statute mandates a hearing | Mother/Magistrate: Use Slowinski facial-insufficiency test (deny without hearing if no set of facts could show imminent danger) | Court: Overrules Slowinski; Rule 7(b)(1) particularity controls; a motion that meets it must be heard within 14 days |
| Whether Father’s motion met the standard | Motion incorporated Feder’s detailed Summary alleging long-term alienation and imminent emotional danger; thus particular and sufficient | Mother: Allegations are long‑standing, not truly "imminent," and conflicting therapist opinions undercut necessity of emergency relief | Court: Motion met Rule 7(b)(1) particularity; magistrate and district court erred in denying a hearing; remand for prompt hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Marriage of Slowinski, 199 P.3d 48 (Colo. App. 2008) (prior court-of-appeals standard for denying § 14-10-129(4) motions without hearing; overruled)
- In re Marriage of Durie, 456 P.3d 463 (Colo. 2020) (motions — including post-decree relief — must satisfy C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1) particularity)
- Warne v. Hall, 373 P.3d 588 (Colo. 2016) (discusses pleading standards under Rule 12(b)(5) and Twombly/Iqbal)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard that inspired modern pleading plausibility analysis)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (clarifies Twombly pleading principles)
- People v. Rolfe, 962 P.2d 981 (Colo. 1998) (sanctions and discipline can follow improper emergency motions alleging imminent danger)
- Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (deference to trial-court factfinding and credibility determinations)
- Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1979) (trial judge’s presence crucial for credibility and weight of evidence)
