In Re the Marriage of Gary E. Erlandson and Susan Kay Erlandson Upon the Petition of Gary E. Erlandson, and Concerning Susan Kay Erlandson, 16-0989

Background

Gary and Susan Erlandson married in 2001, separated around 2010, and executed a written "Stipulation for Separation" that the district court approved in a "decree for separation."
The stipulation awarded Susan the marital home (she assumed the mortgage), assigned Gary responsibility for a $23,000 home equity loan, and addressed pension/retirement accounts in ambiguous language.
The stipulation contained a "complete settlement" clause and a paragraph stating the stipulation would remain in effect if the parties later filed for dissolution.
The parties reconciled for several years but kept separate finances; Gary later filed for dissolution in 2016.
At dissolution, the district court: (1) ratified the separation decree dispositions (home and loan), (2) awarded Susan one-half of Gary’s military pension using the Benson formula, and (3) ordered temporary spousal support of $400/month until December 31, 2018.
Gary appealed, arguing the property division (home, pensions, loan) and the spousal-support award were inequitable and that the court exceeded the separation stipulation by applying Benson; Susan sought appellate fees.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Gary)	Defendant's Argument (Susan)	Held
Whether the separation stipulation controls property distribution in the dissolution	Stipulation is inequitable; court must equitably divide marital property at dissolution	Stipulation is binding; Gary cannot collaterally attack or modify the agreed division	Stipulation controlled; court properly enforced its terms for the home and loan
Proper division of pensions and whether Benson formula could be applied	Pension division ambiguous; if stipulation fixed value at separation date, Susan gets less; Benson addition was improper	Stipulation awarded Susan one-half of Gary’s pension; Benson merely implements that share	Court correctly interpreted stipulation as giving Susan her own pensions and one-half of Gary’s; Benson application to set timing/method was permissible
Whether Susan's failure to cross-appeal the Benson reference bars her argument	Cross-appeal required to contest method	Argument that interpreting stipulation is responsive defense to Gary’s appeal; cross-appeal not required here	Failure to cross-appeal did not preclude Susan defending the stipulation’s meaning; she could respond to Gary’s appeal
Whether the dissolution court could award spousal support despite "complete settlement" clause	No alimony needed because parties handled finances separately since separation; clause precludes later spousal support	"Complete settlement" does not override public policy allowing spousal support; statute permits support in separate maintenance contexts	"Complete settlement" language did not bar spousal support; temporary $400/month award was equitable and affirmed

Key Cases Cited

In re Estate of Whalen, 827 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 2013) (statutory separate maintenance permits division of property analogous to dissolution)
In re Estate of Carlisle, 653 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 2002) (discussing effect of separation decrees and property adjudication)
In re Marriage of Kurtz, 199 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 1972) (distinguishing common-law and statutory separate maintenance decrees)
In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1996) (method/formula for dividing military retirement pay)
In re Marriage of Anliker, 694 N.W.2d 535 (Iowa 2005) (appellate deference and standards for spousal support determinations)
In re Marriage of Berning, 745 N.W.2d 90 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (discretionary nature of appellate attorney fee awards)
Hussemann ex rel. Ritter v. Hussemann, 847 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa 2014) (limits on enforcing postnuptial agreements affecting elective shares)
In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506 (Iowa 2008) (distinguishing standards for premarital/postnuptial agreement enforcement)