In Re the Marriage of Traster, 339 P.3d 778

David drafted a 2004 post-marital agreement allocating most assets to Debra but stating it was fair and enforceable under Kansas law.
The parties also executed a related post-nuptial document designating David's separate assets; Debra relied on her parents' contributions and Debra's limited employability due to brain injury.
The district court initially treated the 2004 agreement as a separation agreement under K.S.A. 60-1610(b)(3) and later voided it as against public policy for encouraging divorce.
The court then crafted a just and reasonable division under K.S.A. 60-1610(b)(1) in the absence of an enforceable agreement, awarding Debra maintenance and life insurance.
The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling the 2004 agreement qualified as a separation agreement under 60-1610(b)(3) and should be incorporated, with fees governed by indemnity clauses.
The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding the 2004 agreement is a separation agreement under 60-1610(b)(3) and remands for a detailed just-and-equitable analysis, while declining to affirm attorney-fee conclusions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the 2004 agreement a separation agreement under 60-1610(b)(3)?	Traster contends it is not a separation agreement; it is a postmarital contract.	Debra argues it is a postmarital agreement not governed by 60-1610(b)(3) and should be controlled by common law.	Yes; the agreement is a separation agreement under 60-1610(b)(3).
Did the district court err in voiding the agreement as against public policy?	Public policy analysis was improper; the agreement should not be voided merely because of disparity.	Disproportionate division created an incentive to divorce, violating public policy.	The public-policy rationale was abrogated by statute; the agreement is not void on that basis.
Is the agreement just and equitable under 60-1610(b)(3) for incorporation?	The agreement was fair and voluntary; the district court should honor it.	The district court must assess whether terms are just and equitable given the circumstances.	Remand for a detailed just-and-equitable review consistent with 60-1610(b)(3).
Should attorney-fee provisions survive if the agreement is incorporated?	Indemnity provisions should govern fees if incorporated.	Any fee issues depend on the just-and-equitable determination and indemnity terms.	Remand may address indemnity-based fee allocation; no final fee ruling on remand.

Ranney v. Ranney, 219 Kan. 428 (Kan. 1976) (public policy with prenuptial-like separations; liberal contract interpretation)
Fincham v. Fincham, 160 Kan. 683 (Kan. 1946) (contracts fixing property rights; public policy distinction for separation)
In re Marriage of Adams, 240 Kan. 315 (Kan. 1986) (premarital agreements framework and enforceability)
In re Marriage of Traster, 291 P.3d 494 (Kan. App. 2012) (two post-marriage categories; separation vs postmarital agreement analysis)
Frazier v. Goudschaal, 296 Kan. 730 (Kan. 2013) (standard for contracts enforcing public-policy analysis)
Davis v. Miller, 269 Kan. 732 (Kan. 2000) (choice-of-law provision in postmarital context; enforceability)