*1 58,759 No. Marriage Raymond Ap-
In E. Adams, Jr., Matter of the pellee, Appellant. Adams, Dublin and Sandra Sue
(729 1151) P.2d Opinion filed December 1986. Hoover, Sloan, Listrom, Eisenbarth, Glassman, Topeka, & Ann L. Sloan cause, Eisenbarth, firm, argued the and Louis F. of the same was with her on the appellant. briefs for Marshall, Marshall, Davis, Hendrix, Topeka, & Herbert A. Bennett cause, argued Perry, firm, and Robert of the same was with him the brief J. appellee. opinion of the court was delivered (Sandra) appeals from a Adams Sue Dublin Holmes, J.: upholding validity of an proceeding in a divorce
decision *2 husband, Raymond her and her agreement between antenuptial agreement the Adams, asserts (Raymond). Appellant E. Jr. (mainte- alimony new trial the issues of and seeks a on invalid property. nance) and division of opinion, stated court, the facts trial in its memorandum
The follows: Adams, 49, petitioner, Raymond E. “Respondent, and Sandra Sue Dublin 18, Hill, Kansas, 53, The Adams, Jr., Maple December 1976. were married in on 1976, 18, during parties antenuptial agreement the hour signed December an on ceremony. signed petitioner’s preceding wedding at The was wedding ceremony was where held. near the home ranch office petitioner respondent respective courtship and and to their “Prior period Respondent general spouses acquainted a some of time. knew in were for by way petitioner’s acquired way holdings he substantial nature of ranching parents and from his and his own business cattle of inheritance endeavors. experienced agent, though “Respondent, real a and estate self-suffi- talented sup- holdings cient, significant of financial value and was held no interests or previous marriage. porting children her her from “Early courtship, August petitioner it clear to in the in on antenuptial respondent remarry anyone signed that he not unless an would stating protect previous his he wished to children from his that petitioner upset respondent, marriage. she that she did not This and advised sign agreements like and did not want to one. such October, 1976, parties see and in set their “The continued to each other arrangements wedding wedding progressed date for December 1976. well; City 9, 1976, quite respondent picked traveled to Kansas October and made; rings. Arrangements schooling wedding re- out her children’s were for spondent terminated her business affairs in New Mexico and moved to Kansas 11, 1976, packers professional and assisted the move. December in around sent, hired, selected, wedding were invitations a clothes were Caterers arranged; fully special ordered, honeymoon truly wedding was was cake carefully ready proceed legal arrangements planned, . . . and to meanwhile proceeding proficiently. were not so Kansas, 1976, prior respondent’s to received “On December move to she calling telephone petitioner was his attor- call from the who indicated he from Wichita, attorney ney’s having was an Kansas and that he draft office any agree- agreement. Respondent objection antenuptial her voiced to respondent’s sent to
ment. indicated that the would be Petitioner attorney Respondent attorney Mexico New contacted her in New Mexico. attorney consulting advising and with him. The New Mexico him of situation attorney. already petitioner’s been contacted Kansas petitioner respondent “Subsequently, he and met traveled to New Mexico and accept attorney. respondent respondent’s with Petitioner was advised respondent further did not discuss the matter at Petitioner prospective Respondent live with her mother-in-law left for Kansas to time. doing wedding asked him to prior but before so contacted to the indicating antenuptial parties her version an draft sign agreements send objected one. He was to a draft to but would to petitioner. her and stayed wedding, “Respondent at her in Kansas one week arrived arrangements. wedding prospective home finalized mother-in-law’s brought up again between the wedding day. until the day, the time that the “On that within one hour from to respondent commence, petitioner arrived at his mother’s home where accompany staying wedding. getting He to him dressed for asked her office, away, antenuptial agreement and he his short distance again there indicated once that unless there was would be Respondent upset, accompanied petitioner office. She but freely voluntarily antenuptial agreement along examined and executed petitioner presence witness. with the of a “Respondent agreement, although opposed the whole idea of itself, possibly of the terms thereof. some *3 proposed by agreement signed copy agreement was a the initial the “The of only initially rejected by respondent petitioner the but the which was document party at and the contents the available the time. Each knew understood of marriage agreement binding at and it was them and the the time it believed signed. party undergone prior a and understood the was Each had divorce experience significance party prior was of Each had business and the document. dealings. astute financial parties, agreement consequence the “The of not the was clear to first rights secondly consequence marriage property their and as to how affected position signed, petitioner’s long if it was and known that there that not obvious wedding would be would come true. held, honeymoon. couple Respon- for a “The was and the left short by proposed antenuptial prepared her New Mex- dent’s shortly ico, generally similar to arrived in mail thereafter. It the one by prior marriage.” parties to the executed are, part, sup- by the the most The facts recited trial court competent then went by evidence. The court ported substantial state: on to the circum- particularly “After careful of the evidence and consideration making agreement parties and its at the of stances of time of upheld agreement and
provisions, should be
enforced.
court finds
fairly
understandably
made.
and
“The
finds
petitioner’s
Respondent
generally
wealth.
nature and extent of
knew
marriage,
Considering
which she
at the
her situation
time of
her,
lifelong security
Through
guaranteed
this extended to
and comfort.
protected
supported.
of the
also
inheritance
children she
petitioner’s children.
a claim of
evidence to substantiate
finds that there is no
“The court further
by
good
his
overreaching.
faith is evidenced further
Petitioner’s
and
fraud
payable
voluntarily
life insurance
to
purchasing
million dollars of
one
voluntary financing
marriage
her children’s
respondent
and
after the
higher education.
and
public policy
void as to
finds the
“The court further
that,
being
separation.
married
encourage
was such
each
Their situation
did not
appro-
marriages,
antenuptial agreement was
with children from those
parties’
priate
protect
terms
are such
interests. The
to
all
separate.
party
something to lose should the
each
fairly
understandably
therefore, being just
equitable,
“The
overreaching
upheld
prevail
as
and shall
to
reached
fraud or
made and not
provisions
therein.
contained
SO ORDERED.”
“IT IS
herein,
specific issues
we deem advis-
turning to the
Refore
principles applicable
type
to this
general
certain
able to iterate
Matlock,
Syl. ¶
576 P.2d
action. In Matlock
(1978), we held:
contracts,
general
state is that
made either before or after
“The
rule in this
property rights
marriage,
purpose
which is to fix
between a husband
wife,
carry
liberally interpreted
out the intentions of the makers and
are to
be
made,
understandably
just
uphold
are
such contracts where
overreaching.
equitable
provisions, and are not obtained
fraud or
in their
against public policy, although
Generally speaking,
a
are not
such contracts
encourage
terms of the contract
different rule obtains where the
parties.”
(1969),
3, ¶
Goetz,
Syl.
Kan.
family circumstances to the ties and whole question being marriage, the in the end and their execution of the contract whether, facts, the intended wife was overreached.” in view of all the by parties provided para- in into entered party retain his and her graphs that each would one two it to the same extent separate property and absolute control over Ray- Paragraph married. three stated parties as if the were not support legal duties to mond was not relieved of relationship. Paragraph five covered the during marriage party, either in the event of the death of property distribution of provided after-acquired property, and seven six covered parties’ successors and binding ip four, directly Paragraph which is involved representatives. proceedings, states: these parties, separation pay Adams shall “4. In the event of or divorce Twenty-four ($24,000) Thousand Dollars within Frizell the sum of [Sandra]
unto events, Twenty-four days of said and the sum of Thousand after earlier 1) ($24,000) thereof, anniversary date until the earlier of Dollars on each Frizell, Adams, Frizell, 3) 4) 2) remarriage of or the death of date death living together parties as husband and of mutual recommence provisions paragraph agreed shall in and in It is of this be lieu of wife. alimony, temporary permanent, attor- full satisfaction of all claims for both neys’ otherwise be entitled in fees other interest to which Frizell would or parties.” divorce of event of necessary determining facts will be stated as Additional appellant. issues raised issues, being the first that the anten-
Appellant raises several uptial agreement is invalid and that the abused its discre- contrary the decision is to the tion its decision. She contends (1) through fraud and over- evidence in that it was obtained made; (3) reaching; (2) understandingly it policy. concerning it public violates The evidence various parties the summer 1976 until the discussions wedding December, to the relative execution of only it hotly disputed. Sandra testified was when she couple times and on each occasion mentioned antenuptial agreement, Ray- want to stated she Raymond, important. off’ and state it wasn’t mond would “back hand, it he had made clear from the on the testified other marriage was an be unless there beginning there would 1976 and divorces in both Roth obtained proceedings. such acutely still aware of the results of the time she the contract contended that at Sandra also agreement upon their return Raymond promised change having honeymoon. Raymond discussed denied ever from he had stated would be any changes or that upset when distraught changed. Sandra testified she and in- morning of Raymond approached her the all the agreement. She testified she cried sign the also sisted she Raymond testified the return therefrom. way to the office and on and, stating crying, while appear upset, was not did not *5 320
didn’t like idea of the she did refuse to it not object type it. Other facts were to the same diametrically opposed testimony. of parties’ antenuptial agreement
Sandra claims the
is unen-
because
not
enter
understandingly
forceable
into the
agreement;
agreement
and/or she entered into the
due to the
duress,
fraud,
overreaching
Raymond.
Sandra cannot be
say
heard
she did
understand the
or the
con-
sequences
signed
agree-
of it. The
identical
was the
ment she reviewed with her
in New Mexico. The terms
unambiguous.
are clear and
She testified she
generally
knew what she was
Sandra had
signing.
been advised
Raymond’s
and extent
knew
nature
assets and
he was a
twenty years
multimillionaire.
She had known him more than
Raymond
large portion
and her
during
father
worked for
She
properties
time.
had visited
ranch
various
gas holdings.
oil and
We think
is clear that Sandra
fully
consequences
aware
its contents and the
competent
of it.
is
support
There
substantial
the trial
evidence to
findings
court’s
and conclusions on these
When
issues.
the trial
findings
law,
court has made
fact and
conclusions
appellate
is
function of
to determine whether
the find-
ings
supported
competent
substantial
evidence
findings
whether
are sufficient
the trial court’s
Co.,
v.
Friedman
Alliance Ins.
of law.
conclusions
240 Kan.
Holly
(1986);
Syl.
In (1930), 283 Pac. brought wife an action to recover certain real devised estate to his previous marriage. husband children from a devisees defended the action based on the terms of an alleged plaintiff contract to exist sought husband. Plaintiff to have her deceased grounds presented similar to based on several those voided *6 judgment trial entered for the defend- the case at bar. The upon pleadings opening the statements of coun- ants based plaintiff appealed. On review this court observed that sel. The signature presented had for on the the deceased court, reversing court, trial very day their The stated: way safeguarded “The safe and certain to have that matter was for Pattison to bride, his affianced have made a fair and have dealt with to reasonable provision for her out of his estate in consonance with his and her financial circumstances, doing. that she what she was and to have made'sure understood seemly plaintiff
An excellent and
course would have been to see to
put
tactless,
independent advice
she
her hand to that contract. It was
before
if not
unfair,
manifestly
present
signature
wedding day
to
to her for her
on her
this
previous
antenuptial contract of which she had no
intimation and as
the effect
to
That,
least,
understanding.
which she had
at
is the
no
substance of her
pleading
opening
and the
statement of her counsel. This court holds that a cause
plaintiff
of action was stated in
s
one occasion. The bride-to-be to such On 29, 1965, day wedding, couple April stopped of their jewelers pick up wedding rings. jewel- While at the to ers, Lutgert pocket Mr. his took out of for the presented prospective signed. first time it to his wife to be followed, phone A call did bride-to-be refused. to statements to the effect that there would be no if the Ultimately, agree- agreement was not executed. she ment. Under the terms of the the wife was to receive $1,000 divorce, alimony although in case of month twenty-five wealth three million husband’s was estimated at to dollars. The Florida court concluded: question here is whether the wife knew what she was
“The
322 getting. she is clear on its face and can’t what she was or she, deny question is exercise whether the free to its contents. The be heard may will, gotten legal voluntarily signed have some Evidence that she it. thing, only great impact evidence this issue either. For one advice has on twenty wedding, legal when the is that within four hours advice rebelled, spoke presented and she husband first already telephone lawyers; we have indicated that the docu- to his conclusively mentary this could not and demonstrates that conversation evidence agreement enuring any change to benefit of wife. not result in in the husband, disproportionate Additionally, grossly face of benefit gotten certainly may at time tend have wouldn’t whatever advice bearing 338 So. 2d factors on her volition.” at neutralize the other coercive 1116-17. results, upon by appellant, reaching relied
Other cases
similar
readily distinguished
case at bar
can be
from the
based
Norris,
A.2d
peculiar
each case. See Norris
982
facts
Maag,
N.W.
(D.C. 1980); In re
119 Neb.
Estate of
*7
94,
Zimmie,
2d
(1930);
v.
11 Ohio St. 3d
464 N.E.
142
Zimmie
Matson,
660,
(1984);
App.
petent
of the trial court that the
evidence to
fairly
understandably
fraud
and
made and
the result of
or
overreaching.”
In re
supporting
arguments
include
Other cases
Cantrell,
546, 119
Estate
(1941),
P.2d 483
and
154 Kan.
Hafer
v.
(1885),
case
Kan.
dence and therefore cannot be set aside
this court.
claim
issue raised
Sandra is her
next
question
against
policy
public
is void as
be-
promote
cause it tends to
or facilitate
or divorce.
Traditionally
there was a distinction
death,
agreements
contemplation
which were entered
into
parties’
contingency,
rights
and fixed the
anten-
uptial
early
dealt
agreements which
with divorce. Most of
cases
from the death of one
and not from
arose
detailing
rights
parties in
Agreements
divorce.
by the
property upon
spouse
the death of either
were favored
law
v.
liberally
Conversely,
33 Kan.
Hafer,
enforced.
449.
Hafer
containing
promoting
terms conducive to or
divorce
contracts
Neddo,
v.
Neddo
policy.
public
were held to violate
(1896).
any antenuptial
is that
The statement agreement will cease payments provided in the her, Raymond predeceases if the state- during Sandra’s lifetime conceivably misleading and errone- ment could be considered However, property brought Sandra also retained all into ous. therefrom, marriage, together with the income or increments may referring provision and the trial have been to that of court We do not conclude that the statement of the trial court is such that the must be invalidated. The terms alimony affecting sug- termination of were identical to those attorney and were unusual gested Sandra’s New Mexico alimony upon maintenance provision in their would cease party. the death either The statement of provided security bearing upon the for life has no factual freely knowingly determinations that she entered into the overreaching by Raymond. Hav- free of fraud or so, ing upon she can its terms based her inter- done not avoid pretation opinion. of one isolated statement its
Finally, appellant asserts error based the trial court’s discovery pertaining limitation of to the financial condition of earlier, appellee. comprehensive As indicated Sandra had a general knowledge assets. She was familiar with farm, ranch, gas holdings, much which had oil family years been in the Adams and which for over he preserve Raymond wanted to for his children. had furnished reflecting Sandra’s with a statement of assets his vast Shawnee, Wabaunsee, Meade, holdings in and Seward Counties Kansas, County, and in Reaver Oklahoma. He had disclosed a inventory $1,500,000.00 approximately potential cattle $150,000.00. discovery tax refunds income control of entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court and orders concerning discovery appeal will not be disturbed on absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Lone Star Inc. Industries, Dept. Transp., Kansas 121, 131-32, Secretary, (1983). Considering large P.2d 511 amount of information Sandra, which was disclosed and available to re limited placed upon discovery by striction the trial court cannot be said to amount to an abuse of discretion. reached, necessary
In view the it is not decision to consider cross-appeal appellee. judgment is affirmed. J., dissenting: I would hold the Herd, *9 having and Sandra Adams voidable Raymond Adams wrongful Duress duress coercion. obtained been a compels assent another to person act of one prevents thus or her volition and without his transaction That in this case. binding contract. occurred of a formation proposed contract to Sandra submitted lawyer sign Her advised Sandra not to independent advice. for Raymond that was not satisfac- Sandra contract the contract. told until tory. Nothing more was said about contract wedding Maple Hill. Sandra had come hour dressing wedding. from New Mexico. She circumstances, Ray- set. Under plans were all these staying. Sandra mond came to mother’s house where There, going his office to Raymond advised Sandra antenuptial agreement, previously which Sandra had rejected; there would be To avoid em- otherwise barrassment, humiliation, quarrel wedding” with coupled threat of “no all surrounding overcame the will of Sandra. circumstances I meeting There of the minds. would set the contract was no aside.