In re Taylor
246 Cal. Rptr. 3d 342
| Cal. Ct. App. 5th | 2019Background
- In 1994 a jury convicted Anthony Taylor of first-degree felony murder for a 1991 liquor-store robbery in which accomplice Marzett Davis shot and killed employee Kathryn Cary; the jury found the Penal Code §190.2(d) special-circumstance (major participant + reckless indifference) true and sentenced Taylor to life without parole.
- Taylor’s role: planner/recruiter and getaway driver; he did not carry or provide the gun, and was not at the immediate scene of the shooting; after the shooting he drove off, later told an accomplice “Fuck that old bitch,” and advised silence.
- On direct appeal the court sustained the special-circumstance finding based largely on Taylor’s planning role and post-shooting conduct (flight and callous remark).
- Taylor petitioned for habeas corpus after the California Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Banks and People v. Clark (which clarified the meaning of “major participant” and “reckless indifference” under §190.2(d)); the Supreme Court issued an order to show cause limited to the Banks issue and the case was remanded.
- The Court of Appeal granted habeas relief: it held that, applying Banks and Clark, Taylor’s post-shooting indifference alone was insufficient to prove he knowingly created a grave risk of death; substantial evidence did not support the reckless-indifference element, so the §190.2(d) true finding was vacated and Taylor was to be resentenced.
- The court declined to decide whether Taylor is entitled to have the underlying murder conviction vacated under Senate Bill No. 1437 / Penal Code §1170.95, directing him to pursue that relief in the trial court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Taylor) | Defendant's Argument (AG) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Taylor’s §190.2(d) special-circumstance finding is supported by substantial evidence of reckless indifference | Taylor: Banks and Clark require more than post hoc callousness; there is no evidence he knowingly created a grave risk of death when planning/abetting the robbery | AG: Prior appellate ruling and superior court correctly found Taylor was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference; petition is procedurally barred/untimely | Held: Vacated. Post-shooting indifference and planning an armed robbery are insufficient alone; substantial evidence did not show Taylor knowingly created a grave risk of death under Banks/Clark |
| Whether Banks/Clark claims are procedurally barred by Waltreus/Lindley or untimely | Taylor: Banks/Clark constitute clarifications; filed promptly after those decisions | AG: Claim was raised on direct appeal and delayed over 20 years | Held: Not barred. Fiore and timeliness principles require measuring delay from Banks/Clark decisions; petition filed within a reasonable period |
| Whether post-shooting conduct (flight, failure to aid, callous remark) can alone establish reckless indifference | Taylor: Such conduct is insufficient by itself to prove the required mens rea | AG: Those facts supported prior findings of callous and reckless indifference | Held: Court agrees with Taylor—post-shooting indifference is relevant but alone cannot establish the requisite mens rea; must be tied to knowingly creating a grave risk during the felony |
| Remedy and scope of relief (effect on murder conviction and resentencing) | Taylor: Vacatur of special circumstance should lead to vacatur of murder conviction under SB 1437 | AG: Did not fully litigate SB 1437 relief below | Held: Court vacated the §190.2(d) special-circumstance true finding and remanded for resentencing; declined to resolve SB 1437 / §1170.95 collateral relief issue and directed Taylor to seek relief in superior court |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (clarified that aider/abettor must have knowingly created a grave risk of death; articulated Banks factors)
- People v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (expounded on the meaning of "reckless indifference" and listed relevant factors for assessing mens rea and participation)
- Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (major participation plus reckless indifference can satisfy Eighth Amendment culpability standard)
- Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (death sentence unconstitutional for aider/abettor who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend a killing)
- Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (due process precludes conviction for conduct that a properly interpreted statute does not prohibit; relevant to retroactive application/clarification issues)