In re Taylor
73 A.3d 85
D.C.2013Background
- Patrice Taylor and Kimberly Hawkins, unrelated women, each obtained intrafamily Civil Protection Orders (CPOs) against the other after communications related to a mutual romantic acquaintance; both consented to issuance of the CPOs without a "good cause" finding.
- Each accused the other of violating her CPO by phone/text/Facebook; they filed reciprocal criminal contempt charges and repeatedly litigated and refiled motions over ~11 months with many court appearances.
- Hawkins, proceeding pro se, prosecuted Taylor for criminal contempt; the trial judge, recognizing Hawkins was unrepresented, actively aided Hawkins at trial (conducting direct examination, assisting cross-examination, asking questions suggested by Hawkins, and guiding the process).
- At the time of trial the prevailing practice allowed private parties to prosecute such contempts, but subsequent D.C. decisions (In re Robertson (Robertson II) and In re Jackson) held intrafamily CPO contempt prosecutions must be brought in the name of the United States and, if no government office will prosecute, a disinterested private attorney must be appointed.
- Taylor did not object at trial to Hawkins’ private prosecution; on appeal the court reviewed under the plain error standard and held the absence of a disinterested government prosecutor was a structural error warranting reversal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hawkins/Prosecution) | Defendant's Argument (Taylor) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a CPO-related criminal contempt prosecution may be privately initiated and prosecuted by the CPO beneficiary | Hawkins (and historical practice) proceeded pro se and treated the prosecution as permissible; government suggested the prosecution could be treated as having been in the name of the United States | Taylor argued (on appeal) that private prosecution was impermissible under later precedent (Robertson II/Jackson) and therefore her conviction was invalid | Court held private prosecution by an interested, pro se beneficiary was impermissible; Robertson II and Jackson require prosecutions be in the name of the United States and handled by USAO/OAG or an appointed disinterested prosecutor |
| Whether Taylor forfeited the right to challenge the absence of a government prosecutor by failing to object at trial (plain error standard) | Government argued Taylor forfeited, and that error was not necessarily plain at trial given evolving law | Taylor argued plain error review applies; absence of government prosecutor is a clear legal deviation under later precedent and affects substantial rights | Court applied plain error: deviation occurred, was plain at time of appeal, and satisfied third and fourth prongs (structural error affecting substantial rights and the integrity/public reputation of proceedings); reversal warranted |
| Whether the absence of a disinterested prosecutor prejudiced Taylor or was a structural error requiring reversal | Government suggested lack of prosecutor may have benefited Taylor and that any prejudice was speculative | Taylor argued absence of a disinterested prosecutor is a structural error that inherently affects fairness and cannot be deemed harmless | Court held the absence of a disinterested government prosecutor is structural error (intrinsically harmful), affecting the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings; reversal appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Robertson, 19 A.3d 751 (D.C. 2011) (intrafamily CPO criminal contempts are penal/public prosecutions that must be brought in the name of the United States)
- In re Jackson, 51 A.3d 529 (D.C. 2012) (trial judges must first seek prosecution by USAO or OAG and may appoint a disinterested private prosecutor only if both decline; judges may not act as prosecutors)
- Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (plain error standard and its purpose in appellate review)
- Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (framework for plain error review and prongs to be satisfied)
- Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (importance of disinterested prosecution in contempt context; problems with interested-party prosecutors)
- Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (prosecutor as representative of the sovereign obligated to seek justice, not merely convictions)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (distinguishing trial errors from structural errors that require automatic reversal)