in Re State of Texas
466 S.W.3d 783
| Tex. | 2015Background
- Angelique Naylor (petitioner) and Sabina Daly were married in Massachusetts and later sought dissolution in Travis County, Texas; Daly initially contested jurisdiction citing Texas law barring recognition of same-sex marriages.
- At a two-day hearing the parties reached an agreement; the trial court orally granted a divorce from the bench pursuant to that agreement and announced the divorce was granted.
- The State of Texas (via the Attorney General’s Office) appeared in court the next day and filed a post-judgment petition to intervene asserting Texas law (constitutional and statutory) bars trial courts from granting divorces to same-sex couples; it also raised a plea to the jurisdiction.
- The trial court refused to entertain the State’s post-judgment intervention as untimely and signed the decree; it did not set aside the oral judgment.
- The court of appeals dismissed the State’s appeal for lack of appellate standing; the State sought review and alternatively requested mandamus relief from this Court.
- The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals: the State lacked standing to appeal (not a party of record, virtual-representation doctrine inapplicable), and mandamus relief was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Naylor/Daly) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State had appellate standing to challenge the divorce decree | The State argued it timely intervened (or was virtually represented) and has a sovereign interest to defend Texas law, entitling it to appeal | Parties argued the State did not timely intervene and is not a party of record; thus it lacks appellate standing | Held: No standing — intervention was post-judgment and untimely; virtual-representation doctrine does not apply; appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction |
| Whether equitable considerations can create appellate standing for the State | The State urged equity should allow third‑party appeal given the importance of defending state law | Parties and majority argued standing is jurisdictional and not expandable by equitable considerations | Held: Equity cannot create appellate jurisdiction; standing is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite |
| Whether the trial court abused discretion by refusing post-judgment intervention | State argued the court should have allowed intervention to resolve a threshold jurisdictional/constitutional question | Parties argued the State delayed despite having opportunity and the court reasonably denied late intervention | Held: Even assuming jurisdiction, no abuse of discretion — trial court properly declined to set aside final judgment to allow late intervention |
| Whether mandamus relief to vacate the decree was appropriate | State sought mandamus as alternate relief to prevent enforcement of a decree it says trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter | Parties argued State did not seek mandamus in court of appeals and offered no compelling reason for Supreme Court to consider unreviewed mandamus | Held: Denied — relator failed to show compelling reason for bypassing the court of appeals and mandamus relief was not warranted on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) (standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction and jurisdictional questions are reviewed de novo)
- Motor Vehicle Bd. of Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. El Paso Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass’n, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 108 (Tex. 1999) (articulation of the virtual-representation doctrine permitting third-party appeals in narrow circumstances)
- First Alief Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1984) (post‑judgment intervention is untimely absent setting aside the judgment)
- S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1995) (judgment is rendered when announced in open court; oral rendition is final when announced as a present act)
- Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1991) (non‑parties may seek mandamus only upon establishing a justiciable interest)
- Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1985) (even void judgments are subject to procedural limits; post‑judgment intervention requires setting aside judgment)
- United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (U.S. 2013) (recognition that marriage regulation has been traditionally within state authority; federal limits on DOMA not dispositive of state definitions of marriage)
