In re Sewell
472 S.W.3d 449
| Tex. App. | 2015Background
- Relator Carlton Sewell was a defendant in a contested probate action challenging a 2007 will; RPI alleged undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity.
- While Sewell was unrepresented (May–Aug 2010), RPI served 16 requests for admissions; Sewell did not timely answer and the requests were deemed admitted under Tex. R. Civ. P. 198.2(c).
- Sewell later had counsel; the new counsel (and a subsequent counsel) did not learn of the requests until the morning of the 2015 trial; Sewell moved to withdraw the deemed admissions and filed belated denials.
- RPI withdrew eight admissions and conceded two (Requests 2 and 4) were merit-preclusive; the trial court denied Sewell’s motion to withdraw the remaining deemed admissions, finding conscious indifference and no good cause.
- The appellate court concluded many of the remaining admissions could be merit-preclusive, required the lower court to apply the more protective standard for merit-preclusive admissions, and conditionally granted mandamus ordering withdrawal of all eight challenged admissions.
Issues
| Issue | Relator's Argument | RPI's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred denying motion to withdraw deemed admissions | Deemed admissions were served while unrepresented; no flagrant bad faith or callous disregard; withdrawal serves merits | Sewell showed conscious indifference; Rule 198.3 good-cause standard not met for non-merit-preclusive admissions | Court: Yes—trial court applied wrong standard; must treat at least some admissions as merit-preclusive and allow withdrawal absent flagrant bad faith |
| Proper standard for withdrawing merit-preclusive admissions | Merit-preclusive admissions trigger due-process concerns; opposing party must prove flagrant bad faith or callous disregard to sustain sanctions | RPI contended some admissions were non-merit-preclusive so ordinary Rule 198.3 (good cause, no undue prejudice, presentation of merits) applies | Court: Merit-preclusive admissions require proof of flagrant bad faith/callous disregard before denying withdrawal; where record doesn’t show non-merit status, presume merit-preclusive |
| Whether Sewell acted with flagrant bad faith or callous disregard | Failure to answer occurred while unrepresented; subsequent discovery and depositions occurred; counsel timely moved to withdraw upon learning | RPI pointed to Sewell’s later (unsigned/uncertified) discovery and delay as evidence of sophistication/indifference | Held: No evidence of flagrant bad faith or callous disregard; relief required under the stricter standard |
| Whether RPI would be unduly prejudiced by withdrawal | Withdrawal would permit resolution on the merits; RPI had deposed Sewell and knew matters were contested; RPI failed to notify Sewell’s counsel earlier | RPI claimed reliance on deemed admissions (e.g., foregone third‑party depositions) causing prejudice | Held: No undue prejudice shown; much prejudice was self-inflicted and RPI had ample notice opportunities; withdrawal appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (mandamus standards; trial-court abuse of discretion)
- Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439 (Tex. 2005) (Rule 198 withdrawal factors; merit-preclusive concept)
- TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991) (due-process limits on case-ending discovery sanctions)
- Marino v. King, 355 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2011) (merit-preclusive admissions implicate same concerns as other case-ending sanctions)
- Stelly v. Papania, 927 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. 1996) (failure to respond must be accidental/mistake vs. conscious indifference)
- Rozelle v. [In re Rozelle], 229 S.W.3d 757 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2007) (mandamus granted where admissions addressed the merits)
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Deggs, 968 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. 1998) (undue prejudice analysis; use of depositions undermines prejudice claim)