In re Santiago G.
2017 Conn. LEXIS 94
Conn.2017Background
- Santiago G., born in Guatemala in 2009, was cared for from birth by Maria G.; federal investigators later concluded Santiago had been brought to the U.S. using forged documents and Maria G. pleaded guilty to a related federal felony.
- The Connecticut Department of Children and Families (commissioner) obtained temporary custody in 2012; Santiago was adjudicated neglected and committed to the commissioner’s custody and placed in a preadoptive foster home.
- The commissioner filed a petition in 2015 to terminate the parental rights of biological mother Melissa E.; Maria G. moved to intervene (as of right and permissively) in that termination proceeding.
- The trial court denied Maria G.’s motion to intervene; Maria G. appealed the denial to the Appellate Court, and the case was transferred to the Connecticut Supreme Court.
- Maria G. separately pursued a habeas action and produced a 2015 Guatemalan court order purporting to grant her custody; the habeas court later granted summary judgment to the commissioner, finding Maria G. could not establish parent or guardian status.
- The Supreme Court dismissed Maria G.’s appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding she had not made a colorable claim to intervene as of right in the termination proceeding.
Issues
| Issue | Maria G.'s Argument | Commissioner’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of motion to intervene is an appealable final judgment | Maria G.: she has a direct and substantial guardianship interest (partly based on habeas/Guatemalan order) so denial is appealable | Commissioner: appeal is interlocutory unless Maria G. shows a colorable claim to intervene as of right; she has none | Held: Not appealable — appeal dismissed for lack of final judgment because no colorable claim to intervene as of right |
| Whether Maria G. has a colorable claim to intervene as of right (four-factor test) | Maria G.: she meets factors (timeliness not disputed) — direct substantial interest, inadequate representation, impairment if rights terminated | Commissioner: termination action concerns only Melissa E.’s parental rights; prospective adopters/third parties do not have a right to intervene in the adjudicatory termination phase | Held: Maria G. failed to plead a colorable direct and substantial interest; termination of Melissa E. would not extinguish any existing right of Maria G. in that proceeding |
| Whether permissive intervention should have been granted | Maria G.: permissive intervention appropriate given her alleged interests and international rulings | Commissioner: permissive intervention improper; her conduct (forged documents, federal guilty plea) and timeliness/prejudice arguments weigh against intervention | Held: Court did not reach merits because no jurisdiction; permissive intervention not considered on appeal after dismissal |
| Whether trial court erred by not considering foreign judgment / international law (Hague, comity, Act of State) | Maria G.: Guatemalan judgment and international doctrines support her custody claim and were improperly ignored | Commissioner: these issues are not relevant to right-to-intervene question in the termination proceeding; habeas was the proper forum | Held: Court did not resolve on merits; noted habeas court addressed and rejected Maria G.’s claims |
Key Cases Cited
- BNY Western Trust v. Roman, 295 Conn. 194 (2010) (articulates four-factor conjunctive test for intervention as of right and standard for a colorable claim)
- Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 279 Conn. 447 (2006) (discusses permissive intervention factors and appellate review of intervention rulings)
- Palmer v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 285 Conn. 462 (2008) (explains appellate jurisdictional requirement of final judgment and interlocutory appeals re: intervention)
- State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27 (1983) (defines final judgment test and two prongs for appealability of interlocutory orders)
- In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263 (1992) (holds that prospective adoptive parties have no right to intervene in the adjudicatory phase of termination proceedings)