In Re: Rodney L. Lincoln v. Jay Cassady, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center
2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 1006
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- In 1983 Rodney L. Lincoln was convicted of manslaughter and two counts of first-degree assault based primarily on eyewitness identification by M.D. and expert testimony that a pubic hair "matched" Lincoln.
- Post-conviction DNA testing (2005) established the hair was not Lincoln's; a prior DNA motion did not secure release because the appellate court found M.D.'s testimony was the key evidence.
- In November 2015 M.D., then adult, recanted her identification, claiming coercion and identifying an alternative suspect description (linked to a Volkswagen repair shop).
- Lincoln filed a Rule 91 habeas petition asserting: a freestanding actual-innocence claim; actual innocence as a gateway to review procedurally barred constitutional claims (Brady, due process re: hair "match", and ineffective assistance); and cause-and-prejudice gateway.
- The Cole County trial court denied relief; Lincoln appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals (Western District), which reviewed whether Lincoln could sustain the procedurally barred claims and whether Amrine permits a freestanding innocence claim in non-capital cases.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether newly discovered evidence permits review of procedurally barred constitutional claims through an actual-innocence gateway | Lincoln: M.D.'s recantation (and DNA) shows actual innocence by a preponderance and entitles him to review of Brady, due-process, and ineffective-assistance claims | State: Even if new evidence exists, Lincoln cannot show those constitutional claims would succeed or that he was prejudiced | Denied—court found Lincoln could not sustain the underlying procedurally barred claims even if gateway were reached; thus no relief on those claims |
| Whether admission of now-discredited hair-comparison testimony violated due process | Lincoln: Hair "match" was pseudo-scientific and pivotal to conviction | State: Hair evidence was not the determinative factor; M.D.'s ID was key | Denied—hair evidence was discredited but was not pivotal; conviction rested on eyewitness ID |
| Whether suppression of DFS records (Brady) prejudiced Lincoln | Lincoln: DFS records show M.D. was coached/uncertain and were suppressed, undermining confidence in verdict | State: Records either not suppressed or cumulative and would not have undermined confidence | Denied—records were cumulative to impeachment already used at trial; no Brady prejudice shown |
| Whether Missouri recognizes a freestanding claim of actual innocence in non-death cases | Lincoln: Amrine supports freestanding innocence as basis for relief | State: Amrine is limited to capital cases; Missouri Supreme Court has not extended freestanding relief to non-capital cases | Denied—court held Amrine’s freestanding rule applies to death-penalty context and appellate court may not extend it to non-capital cases; freestanding claim denied |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. banc 2003) (recognizes freestanding actual-innocence relief in capital cases and frames burden as clear and convincing evidence)
- Lincoln v. State, 457 S.W.3d 800 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) (post-conviction DNA testing excluded Lincoln as source of pubic hair; M.D.'s testimony remained key)
- McKim v. Cassady, 457 S.W.3d 831 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (denial of habeas relief despite new scientific evidence where other trial evidence remained substantial)
- State ex rel. Woodworth v. Denney, 396 S.W.3d 330 (Mo. banc 2013) (discusses freestanding innocence claim; resolved on other grounds)
- Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (U.S. Supreme Court discussion on viability of freestanding innocence claims in federal habeas)
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (standard for gateway actual-innocence showing to excuse procedural default)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality/prejudice standard)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standards for ineffective assistance of counsel)