In Re Robertson, 19 A.3d 751

Watson obtained a Civil/Family Court protective order against Robertson after a violent incident and Robertson was later charged in Superior Court with aggravated assault and related counts.
Robertson entered a plea with the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) for one count of felony attempted-aggravated assault, with the USAO agreeing not to pursue other specified charges.
Ms. Watson, aided by the OAG, moved to adjudicate Robertson in criminal contempt for alleged June 26–27, 1999 violations of the CPO and sought to modify/extend the CPO.
Robertson demanded a jury trial on contempt; the Family Court denied the demand and held a bench trial, finding some counts of contempt and others not proven, and imposing restitution.
Robertson was sentenced to three concurrent 180-day terms with probation, and restitution of about $10,009.23; he challenged the conviction via direct and collateral appeals.
Robertson argued the contempt prosecution violated his plea with the USAO and that the action could not be prosecuted in the Superior Court’s name; the government and District contended the action was enforceable as intrafamily contempt initiated in the name of the United States.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the intrafamily criminal contempt action properly in the United States’ name?	Robertson: action is private to Watson and not in sovereign name.	Watson/USA/DC: action is in United States’ name to enforce the CPO.	Action must be in the United States’ name.
Did Robertson’s plea agreement bar the contempt proceeding?	Robertson: plea bars contempt under agreement not to pursue June 26, 1999 incident.	Watson/USA: plea does not bar contempt; private agreement cannot bind SC authority.	Plea agreement did not bar contempt; no plain error to overlook.
Is there a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not moving to dismiss on plea-breach grounds?	Robertson: trial counsel ineffective for not raising breach.	Watson/USA: counsel’s performance not automatically ineffective for novel theory.	No ineffective assistance; claim rejected.
Was Robertson’s self-defense claim correctly rejected as to Count 5?	Robertson: self-defense should have precluded conviction for lye-throwing.	Watson/Trial court properly applied self-defense standard and found no imminent danger.	Self-defense correctly rejected; no reversal.
Did the trial court err by not granting a jury trial for contempt as a petty offense?	Robertson: restitution plus potential incarceration makes it serious; entitled to jury.	Blanton/Olafisoye: offense qualifies as petty; no jury right.	No jury trial required; offense deemed petty.

Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) (focus on substance over labeling in determining nature of relief)
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (criminal contempt serves judicial authority; not require executive execution)
Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904) (describes purpose of criminal contempt to protect court authority)
Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (plain error standard for collateral claims)
Green v. Green, 642 A.2d 1275 (D.C.1994) (CPO enforcement via intrafamily contempt; beneficiary’s enforcement action)
Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 940 A.2d 1050 (D.C.2008) (initial ruling on sovereign power issue and CPO enforcement; before remand)
Olafisoye v. United States, 857 A.2d 1078 (D.C.2004) (serious vs petty offenses for jury rights; six months threshold)
Duncan v. Louisiana, no citation provided in text (1968) (right to jury trial depends on severity of offense)