In Re R.K.
152 Ohio St. 3d 316
| Ohio | 2018Background
- FCCS sought permanent custody of R.K.; a final hearing was scheduled for July 11, 2016.
- Mother (A.S.) was absent when the hearing began; her court-appointed attorney was present.
- Attorney told the court he had notified A.S. and would ask to withdraw if she did not appear; the court granted the attorney’s oral motion to withdraw.
- The juvenile court proceeded with the permanent-custody hearing without A.S. or counsel and awarded permanent custody to FCCS.
- A.S. appealed; the Tenth District affirmed by a split decision, finding an implicit waiver of counsel. A.S. appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
- The Ohio Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the court improperly allowed withdrawal and proceeded without determining a knowing waiver of counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (A.S.) | Defendant's Argument (FCCS/Court below) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a parent may be deprived of appointed counsel at a permanent-custody hearing when absent | A.S.: absence does not equal waiver; court must find a knowing, intelligent waiver before allowing counsel to withdraw | Court below/FCCS: failure to appear after notice permits inference of waiver and allows counsel to withdraw | Court: Parent has a right to counsel; court cannot infer waiver from unexplained absence; must find a knowing waiver before depriving counsel |
| Whether the juvenile court properly allowed counsel to withdraw without inquiry | A.S.: trial court failed to ascertain attempts to contact client, client’s wishes, or reasons for absence | Court below: counsel had communicated warning and prior communication problems justified withdrawal | Court: withdrawal was improper absent on-the-record inquiry and a finding that client knowingly waived counsel |
Key Cases Cited
- In re D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88 (Ohio 2007) (termination of parental rights compared to death-penalty equivalent; high protections required)
- In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46 (Ohio 1997) (parents in termination proceedings must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection)
- State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385 (Ohio 2015) (waiver defined as an intentional relinquishment of a known right)
- State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464 (Ohio 2014) (standards for knowing, intelligent waiver)
- United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (U.S. 1993) (discussion of waiver principles)
- Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (U.S. 1938) (classic formulation of waiver as intentional relinquishment of a known right)