In re: R.J.Â, 17-237

Background

Four minors (Paul, Luke, Natalie, Robert) were initially admitted to Strategic Behavioral Health, a 24‑hour inpatient mental health facility, but no district‑court hearing was held within 15 days as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C‑224.
Strategic discovered the procedural omission during a self‑audit, discharged and reevaluated the minors, and readmitted them at the end of May/early June 2016.
On 14 June 2016 the district court (Judge Trosch) heard motions to dismiss the readmission proceedings; the motions were denied and the court thereafter concurred in readmission of each minor (Luke consented; Paul, Robert, Natalie initially disagreed and hearings were held for them).
Respondents appealed, arguing (inter alia) that the readmissions were unlawful because the initial admissions violated statutory and due process requirements, and raising subsidiary challenges about required procedural safeguards at voluntary admission hearings.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the readmission orders for Paul, Luke, and Robert, but vacated the readmission order for Natalie because her admission authorization form contained only recorded verbal consent (signed by a facility representative) and not a parent/guardian signature.

Issues

Issue	Respondents' Argument	State/Strategic Argument	Held
Whether readmissions were unlawful because initial admissions lacked statutorily required 15‑day hearings (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C‑224).	Initial admission defects invalidate subsequent readmissions; dismissal required.	Readmissions cured defects because the statutorily required hearings were held at readmission; denying treatment would be inequitable.	Denied; court may proceed on readmission where required post‑admission hearings are held, so initial procedural error did not require dismissal of readmissions.
Whether the trial court must independently verify that admission authorization forms for minors were signed by a legally responsible person before vesting subject‑matter jurisdiction.	Court must make an independent inquiry to confirm the signature came from a legally responsible person.	Legislature did not require an independent judicial verification; court may presume facially valid signed forms are by legally responsible persons unless rebutted.	Held for State: court may presume facially valid parent/guardian signatures are sufficient to invoke jurisdiction; presumption can be rebutted by contrary evidence.
Whether verbal parental/guardian consent memorialized by facility staff (i.e., form signed by facility rep stating verbal consent was received) satisfies the statutory requirement that a legally responsible person sign the admission form for a minor.	Verbal consent (documented by staff) is sufficient to meet signature requirement.	Statute requires a signature by the legally responsible person; no statutory exception for staff‑signed, verbally based entries.	Held for Respondent Natalie: verbal consent recorded and signed by facility representative does NOT satisfy statutory signature requirement; lack of parent/guardian signature meant no subject‑matter jurisdiction and order was vacated.
Whether the court was required to follow a formal colloquy or obtain a written waiver before accepting a minor’s voluntary consent to readmission (Luke).	Due process required a more robust on‑the‑record colloquy or written waiver to ensure consent was informed and voluntary.	No statutory mandate for a specific colloquy or written waiver; the brief on‑the‑record consent was adequate under the statute and precedent.	Held for State: no statutory requirement for a specific colloquy or written waiver; while fuller colloquy is better practice, the short on‑the‑record consent did not violate due process on these facts.

Key Cases Cited

In re T.H.T., 185 N.C. App. 337 (N.C. Ct. App.) (standard of review for findings and conclusions in commitment cases)
In re A.B., 781 S.E.2d 685 (N.C. Ct. App.) (unchallenged findings binding on appeal)
In re McCabe, 157 N.C. App. 673 (N.C. Ct. App.) (findings supported by competent evidence are conclusive)
In re J.S.L., 177 N.C. App. 151 (N.C. Ct. App.) (de novo review of conclusions of law)
In re Wolfe, 803 S.E.2d 649 (N.C. Ct. App.) (subject‑matter jurisdiction for voluntary admission of incompetent adult vests only after statutorily required written application signed by guardian)
In re Lynette H., 323 N.C. 598 (N.C.) (purpose of minor admissions is treatment, not punishment)
In re Long, 25 N.C. App. 702 (N.C. Ct. App.) (parental/guardian rights in admission context)
In re A.N.B., 232 N.C. App. 406 (N.C. Ct. App.) (minor’s liberty interest and due process protections for voluntary commitment)
In re Webber, 201 N.C. App. 212 (N.C. Ct. App.) (limitations on collateral challenges to commitment orders)
In re M.B., 179 N.C. App. 572 (N.C. Ct. App.) (subject‑matter jurisdiction conferred by constitution or statute)
In re H.L.A.D., 184 N.C. App. 381 (N.C. Ct. App.) (subject‑matter jurisdiction cannot be waived)
In re K.U.-S.G., 208 N.C. App. 128 (N.C. Ct. App.) (jurisdictional questions reviewed de novo)
In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588 (N.C.) (acts beyond statutory limits exceed jurisdiction)
In re J.M.D., 210 N.C. App. 420 (N.C. Ct. App.) (court cannot rewrite statute to impose non‑statutory requirements)