218 A.3d 235
D.C.2019Background
- Nicco Settles was charged by the U.S. Attorney under D.C. Code § 8-902(a) for unauthorized disposal of solid waste (a first-offense misdemeanor: max $5,000 fine and 90 days imprisonment).
- Settles argued only the District’s Office of the Attorney General (OAG) may prosecute; the United States (and initially the District) argued the U.S. could prosecute.
- The trial court certified the prosecutorial-authority question under D.C. Code § 23-101(f) to the D.C. Court of Appeals.
- The statutory question: whether a misdemeanor violation of § 8-902 is a violation of a “police or municipal ordinance or regulation” under § 23-101(a) (which would vest prosecution with the District) or instead a penal statute prosecuted by the U.S.
- The court limited its decision to first-offense misdemeanors under § 8-902 and distinguished those from felony or more serious misdemeanor variants (commercial or knowing hazardous/medical waste disposal), which all parties agreed the U.S. must prosecute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (U.S.) | Defendant's Argument (Settles) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a misdemeanor violation of D.C. Code § 8-902(a) is a “police or municipal ordinance or regulation” under § 23-101(a) | § 8-902 should be treated as a penal statute properly prosecuted by the U.S. | § 8-902 is a local police/municipal regulation and thus prosecutable by the D.C. OAG | Held: § 8-902 misdemeanor is a police/municipal regulation; D.C. has prosecutorial authority |
| Relevance of legislative form, codification, and Council intent | Council intent is irrelevant; enactment by Council and placement in D.C. Code favor federal prosecution | Long history of local regulation and Council’s expectation that OAG would prosecute supports D.C. authority | Held: Council intent and local regulatory history are relevant; codification outside criminal title and Council intent support D.C. prosecution |
| Whether the applicable penalties convert § 8-902 into a penal statute beyond OAG enforcement | Penalties are substantial enough to warrant U.S. prosecution | Penalties for first-offense misdemeanor are within range historically enforced by D.C. | Held: Penalties (max $5,000 and 90 days) are not so severe as to render the offense inappropriate for D.C. enforcement |
| Concern about divided prosecutorial authority under a single statutory provision | Divided authority (U.S. for felonies; D.C. for misdemeanors) causes practical problems and should be avoided | Dual prosecutors for different severity levels is acceptable and not dispositive | Held: Practical concerns noted but not dispositive; bifurcated authority here is acceptable |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Crawley, 978 A.2d 608 (D.C. 2009) (addresses § 23-101 allocation of prosecutorial authority)
- In re Hall, 31 A.3d 453 (D.C. 2011) (held certain regulatory offenses are within D.C. prosecutorial authority despite legislative enactment)
- In re Monaghan, 690 A.2d 476 (D.C. 1997) (distinguishes local police/municipal regulations from general prohibitions)
- Williams v. Kennedy, 211 A.3d 1108 (D.C. 2019) (standard of de novo statutory interpretation)
- Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979) (use historical meaning of terms at enactment when interpreting statutes)
- Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989) (discusses relative severity of fines vs. imprisonment)
- United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431 (1960) (distinguishes administrative regulations from statutes)
- District of Columbia v. Moody, 304 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (interpretation of § 23-101 categories)