889 N.W.2d 753
Mich. Ct. App.2016Background
- Lyle and Arbutus Peterson married in 1959 and lived/operated a store with living quarters in Keweenaw County; Lyle later had a long-term extramarital relationship with Susan Strieter.
- In 2006–2007 Lyle moved out of the marital home and lived with Strieter in Houghton County; he continued limited visits to the store and interactions with Arbutus but largely lived apart until his death in September 2011.
- Arbutus continued to maintain the store and marital property, performed spousal duties when Lyle visited, and never sought a divorce; she last saw him in 2009 and did not visit him at Strieter’s home in his final years because she believed he did not want her there.
- Lyle’s November 2006 will was ultimately admitted to probate; Arbutus elected against the will in 2014, prompting Lyle’s daughter Rhonda Lovett to petition that Arbutus be declared not a surviving spouse because she “was willfully absent” for one year prior to death under MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i).
- Probate court denied Lovett’s petition, applying In re Harris Estate and finding no evidence Arbutus intended to give up marital rights; Lovett appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “willfully absent” under MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i) requires physical separation and proof of intent to abandon marital rights | Lovett: statute does not require proof of intent to abandon marital rights; probate court erred imposing that rule | Arbutus: her separation was caused by Lyle; she did not take acts to effectuate absence and did not intend to abandon marital rights | Court: "willfully absent" means physical absence, but does not require proof of intent to relinquish marital rights; however must show acts (or omissions causing separation) done with intent to be absent; here Arbutus did not willfully cause separation, so affirmed |
| Whether continuous physical separation for 1 year is required | Lovett: separation existed; continuous physical absence should suffice to disqualify | Arbutus: separation resulted from Lyle leaving; she remained performing spousal duties when possible | Court: statute requires continuous physical separation for at least one year; but must be caused by the spouse’s willful acts or omissions producing that separation; passive acquiescence absent intent is insufficient |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Harris Estate, 151 Mich. App. 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (construed predecessor statute: "absent" means physical separation and discussed intent to relinquish marital rights)
- In re Raymond Estate, 483 Mich. 48 (Mich. 2009) (standard of review for probate factual findings)
- Pransky v. Falcon Gp., 311 Mich. App. 164 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
- In re Napieraj, 304 Mich. App. 742 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) ("willfully" denotes specific intent)