In re People v. Austin, 2018 CO 47

Ilyias Austin was charged by information with class 4 felony second-degree assault under § 18-3-203(1)(g) (intending to cause bodily injury and causing serious bodily injury).
Austin, released on bond, moved for a preliminary hearing; the district court denied the motion.
The district court reasoned a preliminary hearing is available to a noncustodial defendant charged by information only if the felony requires mandatory sentencing or is a "crime of violence," and concluded the amended assault statute no longer required mandatory sentencing and thus was not a crime of violence.
The Colorado Supreme Court granted relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21 to review whether Austin was statutorily entitled to a preliminary hearing.
The central statutory provision is § 18-1.3-406 (formerly § 16-11-309), which defines "crime of violence" and prescribes mandatory sentencing procedures; prior cases distinguish crimes that trigger mandatory sentencing procedures from crimes that meet the definitional elements of a "crime of violence."
Austin's charged conduct (assault causing serious bodily injury) fits the statutory definition of a "crime of violence" irrespective of the 2016 amendment limiting mandatory incarceration for some § 18-3-203 subsections.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a noncustodial defendant charged by information with a class 4 felony is entitled to a preliminary hearing when the charged offense is a "crime of violence" under § 18-1.3-406	People: The district court correctly denied a preliminary hearing because the 2016 amendment removed mandatory sentencing for § 18-3-203(1)(g), so it no longer triggers the preliminary-hearing entitlement tied to mandatory sentencing	Austin: Even if mandatory incarceration is no longer required, the charged offense meets the statutory definition of a "crime of violence," and that definitional status alone entitles him to a preliminary hearing	The court held Austin is entitled to a preliminary hearing because the charge meets the statutory definition of a "crime of violence" under § 18-1.3-406, and that alone satisfies the statutory condition for a preliminary hearing regardless of changed sentencing mechanics

People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1990) (construing mandatory sentencing and pleading requirements tied to the violent-crime statute)
People v. Russo, 713 P.2d 356 (Colo. 1986) (jury instruction and special finding requirements for violent-crime sentencing)
Brown v. Dist. Court In & For First Judicial Dist., Jefferson Cty., 569 P.2d 1390 (Colo. 1977) (procedural aspects of criminal sentencing statutes)
People v. Grable, 611 P.2d 588 (Colo. App. 1979) (interpretation of violent-crime sentencing procedure)
Terry v. People, 977 P.2d 145 (Colo. 1999) (describing "per se crimes of violence" and mandatory sentencing consequences)
People v. Banks, 9 P.3d 1125 (Colo. 2000) (distinguishing crimes that require mandatory sentencing from crimes that meet the definitional elements of a crime of violence)