931 F.3d 1298
11th Cir.2019Background
- Navarro pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery (Count One) and to a § 924(c) firearms charge (Count Five) as part of a written plea agreement and signed factual proffer.
- The indictment and plea agreement expressly tied the § 924(c) charge to both the Hobbs Act conspiracy (a crime of violence) and drug-trafficking offenses charged in Counts Two and Three.
- The factual proffer (which Navarro acknowledged) described plans to rob a stash house of at least 15 kg of cocaine, the presence of firearms, recorded planning conversations, and items seized at arrest.
- Navarro received a 33-month sentence on Count One and a consecutive 60-month sentence on the § 924(c) count (total 93 months).
- Navarro sought authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion relying on United States v. Davis (invalidating § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause) to challenge: (1) the § 924(c) conviction as no longer having a valid crime-of-violence predicate (the Hobbs Act conspiracy), and (2) vagueness of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a).
- The Eleventh Circuit evaluated whether Navarro made a prima facie showing that Davis’s new rule would entitle him to relief and denied authorization.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Davis invalidates Navarro's § 924(c) conviction | Davis voids § 924(c)(3)(B) so Hobbs Act conspiracy no longer qualifies as a crime of violence; thus § 924(c) conviction unconstitutional | Plea agreement and factual proffer independently establish drug‑trafficking predicates that support § 924(c), so Davis does not affect conviction | Denied — Navarro failed to show a prima facie Davis-based defect because conviction is supported by drug‑trafficking offenses |
| Whether Davis renders U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a) unconstitutionally vague | Davis’s vagueness holding applies to the Guidelines provision | Davis did not address the Guidelines; Beckles forecloses vagueness challenges to advisory Guidelines | Denied — Davis does not apply to § 2K2.1(a); claim fails statutory criteria |
Key Cases Cited
- Jordan v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 485 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2007) (prima facie threshold for successive petitions)
- United States v. Frye, 402 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 2005) (factual proffer can support § 924(c) predicate without separate conviction)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenge)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (void-for-vagueness doctrine for residual clauses)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (applying vagueness principles to immigration statute)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (retroactivity of Johnson to collateral review)
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (invalidating § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause)
- In re Hammoud, 931 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2019) (Davis announces new, retroactive rule for § 924(c))
- In re Baptiste, 828 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016) (limitations on successive petitions based on earlier vagueness decisions)
- In re Henry, 757 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2014) (applicant must show reasonable likelihood of benefit from new rule)