657 F. App'x 350
6th Cir.2016Background
- Passenger Nancy Buccina was injured when the boat she was on, driven by Linda Grimsby, struck a large wake on the Maumee River; Buccina sued for negligence in federal court under admiralty jurisdiction.
- Buccina moved in limine to invoke the rule of The Pennsylvania, which places on a vessel in statutory violation the burden to show the violation could not have caused the injury.
- The district court denied application of The Pennsylvania rule, reasoning that it applies only to "collisions" between vessels and not to strikes with wakes or waves, and certified an interlocutory question under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
- The certified question asked whether a "collision" (as used in the Inland Navigation Rules) includes a vessel striking a wake or wave so as to trigger The Pennsylvania rule.
- The Sixth Circuit agreed the question was controlling and could materially advance the case but held Buccina failed to show a "substantial ground for difference of opinion," and dismissed the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
- A concurrence agreed the procedural dismissal was proper but noted some precedent and district-court decisions suggest the term "collision" might be read more broadly to include wake-related incidents.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the rule of The Pennsylvania applies when a vessel strikes a wake/wave (i.e., whether that is a "collision") | Buccina: "Collision" under the Inland Rules includes strikes by a vessel's wake, so The Pennsylvania burden-shifting should apply | Grimsby: "Collision" means two moving vessels striking each other; hitting a wake/wave is not a collision and The Pennsylvania does not apply | Court: Dismissed interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction because no substantial ground for difference of opinion; held prior precedent supports a narrow definition of collision (two vessels) so certification under §1292(b) not warranted |
| Whether the §1292(b) certification standard is met ("substantial ground for difference of opinion") | Buccina: The issue is novel and there is conflicting district-court treatment, so substantial difference exists | Grimsby: Sixth Circuit precedent defines "collision" narrowly, and there is no circuit split or intra-circuit disagreement sufficient to meet §1292(b) | Court: No substantial ground for difference of opinion (not a difficult/novel question in this circuit); interlocutory appeal dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125 (1873) (establishes burden-shifting that vessel in statutory violation must show violation could not have caused damage)
- Grosse Ile Bridge Co. v. Am. S.S. Co., 302 F.3d 616 (6th Cir.) (rule of The Pennsylvania applies only to collisions)
- Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. Seaway Marine Transp., 596 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2010) (defines "collision" as when two moving vessels strike each other)
- Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328 (1924) (treats "collision" as involving two vessels)
- Matheny v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 557 F.3d 311 (6th Cir.) (recognizes in dictum that "collision" under Inland Rules can be read broadly to include wake impacts)
- In re Miedzianowski, 735 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2013) (standard for finding a "substantial ground for difference of opinion" under §1292(b))
- Kraus v. Board of County Rd. Comm’rs, 364 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1966) (§1292(b) not intended for ordinary, brief personal-injury suits)
- In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 67 F.3d 1200 (6th Cir. 1995) (boat liable for damage caused by excessive wake)