86 U.S. 125 | SCOTUS | 1874
THE PENNSYLVANIA.
Supreme Court of United States.
*129 Messrs. William Allen Butler and John Chetwood, for the appellants.
*131 Mr. R.D. Benedict, contra.
*133 Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion of the court.
It may be that when the bark was discovered by those on board the steamer it was too late to avoid a collision. The two vessels were then not more than three or four hundred feet apart, and the steamer had the bark almost across her bow. Yet it is possible that if her helm had been put to starboard instead of to port when the lookout announced, "Bell on the starboard bow," and had been kept starboarded, the collision might either have been avoided or have been much less disastrous. By porting her helm she was turned toward the point where the bell indicated the bark was, and this apparently increased the danger of a collision.
But if this is not to be attributed to her as a fault, there is no excuse to be found in the evidence for the high rate of speed at which she was sailing during so dense a fog as prevailed when the vessels came together. The concurrent testimony of witnesses is that objects could not be seen at any considerable distance, probably not farther than the length of the steamer, and yet she was sailing at the rate of at least seven knots an hour, thus precipitating herself into a position where avoidance of a collision with the bark was difficult, if not impossible, and would have been, even if the bark had been stationary. And she ought to have apprehended danger of meeting or overtaking vessels in her path. She was only two hundred miles from Sandy Hook, in the track of outward and inward bound vessels, and where their presence might reasonably have been expected. It was, therefore, her duty to exercise the utmost caution. Our rules of navigation, as well as the British rules, require every steamship, when in a fog, "to go at a moderate speed." What is such speed may not be precisely definable. It must depend upon the circumstances of each case. That may be moderate and reasonable in some circumstances which would be quite immoderate in others. But the purpose of the requirement *134 being to guard against danger of collisions, very plainly the speed should be reduced as the risk of meeting vessels is increased. In the case of The Europa,[*] it was said by the Privy Council: "This may be safely laid down as a rule on all occasions, fog or clear, light or dark, that no steamer has a right to navigate at such a rate that it is impossible for her to prevent damage, taking all precaution at the moment she sees danger to be possible, and if she cannot do that without going less than five knots an hour, then she is bound to go at less than five knots an hour." And we do not think the evidence shows any necessity for such a rate of speed as the steamer maintained. It is true her master, while admitting she was going seven knots, states that he don't consider she could have been steered going slower could not have been steered straight. And two other witnesses testify that, in their opinion, she could not have been navigated with safety and kept under command at a less rate of speed than seven miles an hour. These, however, are but expressions of opinions based upon no facts. They are of little worth. And even if it were true that such a rate was necessary for safe steerage, it would not justify driving the steamer through so dense a fog along a route so much frequented, and when the probability of encountering other vessels was so great. It would rather have been her duty to lay to. But there is the evidence of one who had been a shipmaster, and who once crossed the Atlantic as a passenger in this steamer. He states that on the passage she did not, to the best of his knowledge, average over four knots during twenty-four hours, and that he noticed no difficulty in her steerageway at that low rate of speed. As he was in the habit of going to sea he would probably have noticed difficulty if there had been any. This is a fact of more weight than any mere opinions unsupported by observation or trial. We think, therefore, it must be concluded that the steamer was going at an undue rate of speed, and that it was her fault that she came into a position from *135 which she could not, or certainly did not, escape without colliding with the bark.
It is next to be considered whether any fault of the bark contributed to the collision. That she was in fault is beyond controversy. She was in plain violation of the rules of navigation, which required her to blow a foghorn. Both our own and the British shipping acts enact that sailing ships, when under way, shall use a foghorn, and, when not under way, shall use a bell. The British merchants' shipping acts expressly declare that owners and masters of ships shall use no other fog signals than such as are required by the regulations, and that if in any case of collision it appears to the court before which the case is tried that such collision was occasioned by the non-observance of any regulation made by the act, or in pursuance thereof, the ship by which the regulation has been infringed shall be deemed to be in fault, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the circumstances of the case made a departure from the regulation necessary. Our own statute does not contain this provision expressed, but its meaning is the same. The bark in this case was a British ship, as was the steamer. She was under way, moving slowly, indeed little, if any, more than a mile an hour, with her helm lashed three-quarters to port, but on her starboard tack, carrying two close-reefed topsails, foresail, foretopmast and mizzen staysails, and with no sails aback, so far as it appears. She was constantly changing her position. It was her duty, therefore, to blow a foghorn, and not to ring a bell. By ringing a bell, as she did, she gave a false signal, and, so far as she could, assured all approaching vessels that she was not under way. There is some evidence that a bell can be heard as far as can a foghorn, and some that it can be heard farther. On the other hand there is evidence that a foghorn can be heard farthest. However this may be the bark had no right to substitute any equivalent for the signal required by the navigation rules. In the case of The Emperor,[*] it was said, "It is not *136 advisable to allow these important regulations to be satisfied by equivalents, or by anything less than a close and literal adherence to what they prescribe." In addition to this it may be remarked that a bell can never be an equivalent for a foghorn. It gives different information. Both may notify an approaching vessel that the signalling ship is in the neighborhood, but the one gives notice that the ship is moving, and the other that the ship is stationary.
Concluding then, as we must, that the bark was in fault, it still remains to inquire whether the fault contributed to the collision, whether in any degree it was the cause of the vessels coming into a dangerous position. It must be conceded that if it clearly appears the fault could have had nothing to do with the disaster, it may be dismissed from consideration. The liability for damages is upon the ship or ships whose fault caused the injury. But when, as in this case, a ship at the time of a collision is in actual violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions, it is no more than a reasonable presumption that the fault, if not the sole cause, was at least a contributory cause of the disaster. In such a case the burden rests upon the ship of showing not merely that her fault might not have been one of the causes, or that it probably was not, but that it could not have been. Such a rule is necessary to enforce obedience to the mandate of the statute. In the case of The Fenham,[*] the Lords of the Privy Council said, "It is of the greatest possible importance, having regard to the admiralty regulations, and to the necessity of enforcing obedience to them, to lay down this rule: that if it is proved that any vessel has not shown lights, the burden lies on her to show that her non-compliance with the regulations was not the cause of the collision." In some cases it is possible to show this with entire certainty. In others it cannot be. The evidence in the present case leaves it uncertain whether if a foghorn had been blown on the bark, it would not have been heard sooner than the bell was heard, and thus earlier warning *137 have been given to the steamer seasonable warning to have enabled her to keep out of the way. It was not without reason that the statute required a foghorn for ships under way, and a bell for those not under way. The legislature must have known it was important ships should have the earliest possible notice of the proximity of other moving vessels. They might be approaching each other. If so, they would come together sooner than they could if one of them was not under way. It may be assumed, therefore, that the legislature acted under the conviction that a foghorn could be heard at a greater distance than a bell, and required the use of one rather than that of the other for that reason. To go into the inquiry whether the legislature was not in error whether in fact a bell did not give notice to the steamer that the bark was where she was as soon as a foghorn would have done is out of place. It would be substituting our judgment for the judgment of the lawmaking power. It would be admitting the validity of an equivalent for that which the statute has made a positive requirement. Then how can it be shown on the part of the bark that the failure to use a foghorn certainly contributed in no degree to the collision? How can it be proved that if a foghorn had been blown those on board the steamer would not have heard it in season to have enabled them to check their speed or change their course, and thus avoid any collision? Though there were two lookouts on the steamer, each in his proper place, the bark's bell was not heard until the vessels were close upon each other. Who can say the proximity of the vessels would not have been discovered sooner if the bark had obeyed the navy regulations? If it be said this is speculation, it may be admitted, but it is speculation rendered necessary by a certain fault of the bark. It is equally speculative to conclude that the collision would have taken place if a foghorn had been used instead of a bell, and infer therefrom that the fault of the bark had no relation to the disaster. The truth is the case is one in which, while the presumption is that the failure to blow a foghorn was a contributory cause of the collision, *138 and while the burden of showing that it was in no degree occasioned by that failure rests upon the bark, it is impossible to rebut the presumption. It is a well-known fact that in some states of the atmosphere a foghorn can be heard at much greater distances than in others. How far it could have been heard when this collision occurred can never be known. Nor can it be known what precautions the steamer would have adopted if the true and proper signal had been given her. Hence, it appears to us the bark has not proved that her failure to obey the shipping regulations was not a concurrent cause of the injury she received; and, consequently, as both vessels were in fault, the damages, according to the admiralty rule, should be divided.
We have not overlooked the fact that in a libel by the owners of the cargo of the bark against the steamer for damages resulting from the same collision, it was held by the judicial committee of the Privy Council in England, that the disaster was chargeable to the steamer alone. But with great respect for the tribunal that thus decided, we do not feel at liberty to surrender our judgment, especially in view of the fact that the case is now more fully presented and the evidence is more complete than it was in the British court.
DECREE REVERSED, and the cause remanded with instructions to enter a decree
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION.
NOTES
[*] Jenkins's Rule of the Road at Sea, 52.
[*] Holt's Rule of the Road, 38.
[*] 23 Law Times, 329.
