In Re Motors Liquidation Co. (Pillars), 957 F.3d 357

Old GM sold assets in 2009 under § 363; the sale agreement was amended (June 30) to limit New GM’s assumed liabilities to injuries "first occurring on or after" the July 10, 2009 closing date, narrowing an earlier June 26 draft that used broader "distinct and discrete occurrences" language.
Kathleen Pillars suffered a 2005 crash (alleged faulty ignition); she later died and her widower, Benjamin Pillars, sued New GM for wrongful death in Michigan.
New GM removed the case and, in its original notice of removal and answer, quoted language from the superseded June 26 draft (broader scope) but attached the correct operative June 30 agreement to the removal.
The bankruptcy court treated New GM’s erroneous citation as a judicial admission that it assumed broader liabilities and lifted a stay on Pillars’ Michigan suit; New GM amended its filings and sought reconsideration.
The district court vacated the bankruptcy court’s ruling, holding the bankruptcy court misapplied the judicial-admission standard; the Second Circuit affirmed, holding an accidental citation to superseded contractual language is not a judicial admission.

Issue	Pillars' Argument	New GM's Argument	Held
Whether New GM’s citation of superseded sale-agreement language in its initial filings constituted a judicial admission that New GM assumed broader liabilities	The erroneous citation bound New GM to the broader June 26 language, so Pillars’ claim survives under that scope	Judicial admissions must be intentional, clear, and unambiguous; the citation was a mistake and contradicted the operative agreement attached to the removal	Not a judicial admission; accidental citation to a non‑operative draft is insufficient; admission must be intentional, clear, unambiguous
Whether descriptions of assumed liabilities are the kind of "facts" that can be judicial admissions	Pillars treated the description as a factual admission	New GM questioned whether such descriptions are legal conclusions rather than facts and argued mistake precludes admission	Court expressed doubt about treating such descriptions as pure facts but resolved the case on intent: even if factual, the language was not an intentional, clear, unambiguous admission

Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2003) (judicial admission definition and binding effect)
Bellefonte Re Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1985) (judicial admissions withdraw facts from contention)
Stichting Ter Behartiging Van de Belangen Van Oudaandeelhouders In Het Kapital Van Saybolt Int’l B.V. v. Schreiber, 407 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2005) (judicial admissions must be factual, not merely legal arguments)
Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965) (statements require sufficient formality/conclusiveness to be admissions)
MacDonald v. General Motors Corp., 110 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1997) (attorney statements qualify as judicial admissions only if deliberate and clear)
Choice Escrow and Land Title, LLC v. BancorpSouth Bank, 754 F.3d 611 (8th Cir. 2014) (judicial admission must be deliberate, clear, unambiguous)
Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880) (courts may act on facts conceded by counsel but not where doubt exists as to counsel’s statement)