19-3331
2d Cir.Dec 14, 2020Background
- Melissa Maresca and ex-husband Charles Crilly jointly own a house in Essex, CT; Crilly lives there as his primary residence and Maresca lives elsewhere.
- Their minor son is a dependent of Maresca, spends several days each week at the Essex property with Crilly, and attends school in the property’s town.
- Creditor Terry Donovan obtained a judgment for unpaid legal fees against Maresca and recorded a judicial lien on the Essex property.
- Maresca filed Chapter 7, claimed the federal § 522(d)(1) homestead exemption in her interest in the property based on her dependent’s use, and moved under § 522(f)(1)(A) to avoid Donovan’s lien.
- The bankruptcy court and the district court adopted a plain-meaning approach (not a state-law homestead definition) and held that “residence” includes non-primary residences, so Maresca’s exemption applied; Donovan appealed to the Second Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “residence” in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) covers non‑primary residences | Maresca: “residence” is unqualified ordinary language and includes non‑primary residences used by a dependent | Donovan: “residence” should be read as “primary residence” (state homestead definition) | The court held that “residence” includes both primary and non‑primary residences |
Key Cases Cited
- Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369 (2013) (plain‑meaning statutory construction governs when text is unambiguous)
- Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991) (judicial liens may be avoided to the extent they impair exemptions)
- Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993) (inclusion/omission of language across statute sections is instructive)
- Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014) (courts must give effect to every clause and word of a statute)
- In re Stoner, 487 B.R. 410 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2013) (example of the state‑law/homestead approach rejecting non‑primary residences)
- In re Demeter, 478 B.R. 281 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2012) (example of the plain‑meaning approach including non‑primary residences)
- In re Hyman, 502 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2007) (questions of law reviewed de novo)